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INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY:
CASES AND MATERIALS
HERBERT HOVENKAMP
CHAPTER TEN (2d ed)
POST-SALE AND RELATED DISTRIBUTION RESTRAINTS
INVOLVING IP RIGHTS
ADAMS v. BURKE
84 U.S. 453 (1873)
Mr. Justice MILLER delivered the opinion of the court.
The question presented by the plea in this case is a very interesting one in
patent law, and the precise point in it has never been decided by this court,
though cases involving some of the considerations which apply to it have been
decided, and others of analogous character are frequently recurring. The vast
pecuniary results involved in such cases, as well as the public interest, admonish
us to proceed with care, and to decide in each case no more than what is directly
in issue.
We have repeatedly held that where a person had purchased a patented
machine of the patentee or his assignee, this purchase carried with it the right to
the use of that machine so long as it was capable of use, and that the expiration
and renewal of the patent, whether in favor of the original patentee or of his
assignee, did not affect this right. The true ground on which these decisions rest
is that the sale by a person who has the full right to make, sell, and use such a
machine carries with it the right to the use of that machine to the full extent to
which it can be used in point of time.
The right to manufacture, the right to sell, and the right to use are each
substantive rights, and may be granted or conferred separately by the patentee.
But, in the essential nature of things, when the patentee, or the person having
his rights, sells a machine or instrument whose sole value is in its use, he
receives the consideration for its use and he parts with the right to restrict that
use. The article, in the language of the court, passes without the limit of the
monopoly. That is to say, the patentee or his assignee having in the act of sale
received all the royalty or consideration which he claims for the use of his
invention in that particular machine or instrument, it is open to the use of the
purchaser without further restriction on account of the monopoly of the
patentees.
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If this principle be sound as to a machine or instrument whose use may be
continued for a number of years, and may extend beyond the existence of the
patent, as limited at the time of the sale, and into the period of a renewal or
extension, it must be much more applicable to an instrument or product of
patented manufacture which perishes in the first use of it, or which, by that first
use, becomes incapable of further use, and of no further value. Such is the case
with the coffin-lids of appellant's patent.
It seems to us that, although the right of Lockhart & Seelye to manufacture, to
sell, and to use these coffin-lids was limited to the circle of ten miles around
Boston, that a purchaser from them of a single coffin acquired the right to use
that coffin for the purpose for which all coffins are used. That so far as the use
of it was concerned, the patentee had received his consideration, and it was no
longer within the monopoly of the patent. It would be to engraft a limitation
upon the right of use not contemplated by the statute nor within the reason of
the contract to say that it could only be used within the ten-miles circle.
Whatever, therefore, may be the rule when patentees subdivide territorially their
patents, as to the exclusive right to make to to sell within a limited territory, we
hold that in the class of machines or implements we have described, when they
are once lawfully made and sold, there is no restriction on their use to be implied
for the benefit of the patentee or his assignees or licensees.
A careful examination of the plea satisfies us that the defendant, who, as an
undertaker, purchased each of these coffins and used it in burying the body
which he was employed to bury, acquired the right to this use of it freed from
any claim of the patentee, though purchased within the ten-mile circle and used
without it.
The decree of the Circuit Court dismissing the plaintiff's bill is, therefore,
AFFIRMED.
Mr. Justice BRADLEY (with whom concurred Justices SWAYNE and STRONG),
dissenting:
The question raised in this case is whether an assignment of a patented
invention for a limited district, such as a city, a county, or a State, confers upon
the assignee the right to sell the patented article to be used outside of such
limited district….
If it were a question of legislative policy, whether a patentee should be allowed
to divide up his monopoly into territorial parcels, it might admit of grave doubt
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whether a vendee of the patented article purchasing it rightfully, ought to be
restrained or limited as to the place of its use. But the patent act gives to the
patentee a monopoly of use, as well as of manufacture, throughout the whole
United States; and the eleventh section of the act (of 1836) expressly authorizes
not only an assignment of the whole patent, or any undivided part thereof, but a
‘grant and conveyance of the exclusive right under any patent, to make and use,
and to grant to others to make and use the thing patented within and
throughout any specified part or portion of the United States.'
If an assignment under this clause does not confer the same rights within the
limited district which the patentee himself previously had in the whole United
States, and no more, it is difficult to know what meaning to attach to language
however plain….
On the 13th day of March, 1865, Merrill & Horner, the patentees, by an
assignment duly executed and recorded, did assign to Lockhart & Seelye, of
Cambridge, in Middlesex County, Massachusetts, all the right, title, and interest
which the said patentees had in the invention described in the said letterspatent, for, to, and in a circle whose radius is ten miles, having the city of Boston
as a centre. By necessary consequence (as it seems to me), the right thus
assigned consisted of the exclusive right to make, use, and vend the improved
coffin-lid within the limited territory described; but did not include any right to
make, use, or vend the same outside of those limits. As the assigned right to
make the lids was a restricted right, limited to the territory; so the assigned right
to use them was a restricted right limited in the same manner. Each right is
conveyed by precisely the same language. A different construction would defeat
the intent of the parties. For if the assignees, after making any number of lids
within the limited district, could use them or authorize others to use them
outside of the district, the balance of the monopoly remaining in the hands of the
patentees might be rendered of little value.
If it be contended that the right of vending the lids to others enables them to
confer upon their vendees the right to use the lids thus sold outside of the
limited district, the question at once arises, how can they confer upon their
vendees a right which they cannot exercise themselves? The only consistent
construction to be given to such an assignment is, to limit all the privileges
conferred by it to the district marked out. It is an assignment of the manufacture
and use of the patented article within that district, and within that district only.
Difficulties may, undoubtedly, be suggested in special cases. If the patented
thing be an article of wearing apparel, sold by the assignee within his district, it
is confidently asked, cannot the purchaser wear the article outside of the district?
The answer to acute suggestions of this sort would probably be found (in the
absence of all bad faith in the parties) in the maxim de minimis non curat lex.
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On the other hand, the difficulties and the injustice which would follow from a
contrary construction to that which I contend for, are very obvious. Take the
electric telegraph, for example. Suppose Professor Morse had assigned his patent
within and for the New England States. Would such an assignment authorize the
vendees of his assignees to use the apparatus in the whole United States? Take
the planing machine: would an assignment from Woodworth of his patent within
and for the State of Vermont, authorize the assignees to manufacture machines
ad libitum, and sell them to parties to be used in other States? So of Hoe's
printing press, and a thousand other machines and inventions of like sort.
Such a doctrine would most seriously affect not only the assignor (as to his
residuary right in his patent), but the assignee also. For if it be correct, there
would be nothing to prevent the patentee himself, after assigning his patent
within a valuable city or other locality, from selling the patent machine or article
to be used within the assigned district. By this means, the assignment could be,
and in numberless instances would be, rendered worthless. Millions of dollars
have been invested by manufacturers and mechanics in these limited
assignments of patents in our manufacturing districts and towns, giving them, as
they have supposed, the monopoly of the patented machine or article within the
district purchased. The decision of the court in this case will, in my view, utterly
destroy the value of a great portion of this property.
NOTES AND QUESTIONS
1. The majority in Adams found that once a patented good is purchased lawfully,
that good can be used anywhere. Further, “[t]he right to manufacture, the right
to sell, and the right to use are each substantive rights, and may be granted or
conferred separately by the patentee.” Are the dissenters misunderstanding the
issue, which is not whether a license can restrain where the licensee
manufactures the product, but whether it can restrain the location whether a
particular copy of a patented article is used after the sale?.
2. The first sale doctrine dates back to a series of decisions in which the
Supreme Court was confronted with the problem of retroactive patent term
extensions. The issue typically arose when a patentee sold a patented article
subject to a use restriction intended (explicitly or implicitly) to apply for the
balance of the patent term, but then Congress extended the term retroactively.
The question was then whether the restriction still applied during the extension
period. The position that the Supreme Court eventually reached was that once a
patent article was sold the post-sale restriction did not apply at all, not even
immediately after the sale. See Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. 544 (1872) (“but
when [the patent owner has] made one or more of the things patented, and
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have vended the same to others to be used, they have parted to that extent with
their exclusive right”); Wilson v. Rousseau, 45 U.S. 646 (1846) (once the patent
owner has sold “the thing patented” he no longer has any rights in the
invention). For a brief history of the first sale doctrine and its application to the
digital age, see Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Digital Exhaustion, 58 UCLA
L. REV. 889 (2011).
GENERAL TALKING PICTURES CORP. v. WESTERN ELECTRIC CO., INC
305 U.S. 124 (1939)
Mr. Justice BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
… 1. Can the owner of a patent, by means thereof, restrict the use made of a
device manufactured under the patent, after the device has passed into the
hands of a purchaser in the ordinary channels of trade, and full consideration
paid therefore?
2. Can a patent owner, merely by a ‘license notice’ attached to a device made
under the patent, and sold in the ordinary channels of trade, place an
enforceable restriction on the purchaser thereof as to the use to which the
purchaser may put the device?
Upon further hearing we are of opinion that neither question should be
answered. For we find that, while the devices embody the inventions of the
patents in suit, they were not manufactured or sold ‘under the patent(s)’ and did
not ‘pass into the hands of a purchaser in the ordinary channels of trade.’
These are the relevant facts. Amplifiers embodying the invention here involved
are useful in several distinct fields. Among these is (a) the commercial field of
sound recording and reproducing, which embraces talking picture equipment for
theatres, and (b) the private or home field, which embraces radio broadcast
reception, radio amateur reception and radio experimental reception. For the
commercial field exclusive licenses had been granted by the patent pool to
Western Electric Company and Electrical Research Products, Inc. For the private
or home field the patent pool granted non-exclusive licenses to about fifty
manufacturers. Among these was American Transformer Company. It was
licensed ‘solely and only to the extent and for the uses hereinafter specified and
defined * * * to manufacture * * *, and to sell * * * only for radio amateur
reception, radio experimental reception and radio broadcast reception * * *
licensed apparatus so manufactured by the Licensee. * * *’
The license provided further: ‘Nothing herein contained shall be regarded as
conferring upon the Licensee either expressly or by estoppel, implication or
otherwise, a license to manufacture or sell, any apparatus except such as may be
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manufactured by the Licensee in accordance with the express provision of this
Agreement.’
Transformer Company, knowing that it had not been licensed to manufacture or
to sell amplifiers for use in theatres as part of talking picture equipment, made
for that commercial use the amplifiers in controversy and sold them to Pictures
Corporation for that commercial use. Pictures Corporation ordered the amplifiers
and purchased them knowing that Transformer Company had not been licensed
to make or sell them for such use in theatres. Any use beyond the valid terms of
a license is, of course, an infringement of a patent. Robinson on Patents, § 916.
If where a patented invention is applicable to different uses, the owner of the
patent may legally restrict a licensee to a particular field and exclude him from
others, Transformer Company was guilty of an infringement when it made the
amplifiers for, and sold them to, Pictures Corporation. And as Pictures
Corporation ordered, purchased and leased them knowing the facts, it also was
an infringer.
The question of law requiring decision is whether the restriction in the license is
to be given effect. That a restrictive license is legal seems clear. Mitchell v.
Hawley, 16 Wall. 544, As was said in United States v. General Electric Co., 272
U.S. 476, 489, , the patentee may grant a license ‘upon any condition the
performance of which is reasonably within the reward which the patentee by the
grant of the patent is entitled to secure.’ The restriction here imposed is of that
character. The practice of granting licenses for a restricted use is an old one, see
Providence Rubber Company v. Goodyear, 9 Wall. 788, 799, 800; Gamewall FireAlarm Telegraph Co. v. Brooklyn, C.C., 14 F. 255. So far as appears, its legality
has never been questioned. The parties stipulated that ‘it is common practice
where a patented invention is applicable to different uses, to grant written
licenses to manufacture under United States Letters Patents restricted to one or
more of the several fields of use permitting the exclusive or non-exclusive use of
the invention by the licensee in one field and excluding it in another field.’
As the restriction was legal and the amplifiers were made and sold outside the
scope of the license, the effect is precisely the same as if no license whatsoever
had been granted to Transformer Company. And as Pictures Corporation knew
the facts, it is in no better position than if it had manufactured the amplifiers
itself without a license. It is liable because it has used the invention without
license to do so.
We have consequently no occasion to consider what the rights of the parties
would have been if the amplifier had been manufactured ‘under the patent’ and
‘had passed into the hands of a purchaser in the ordinary channels of trade.’ Nor
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have we occasion to consider the effect of a ‘licensee's notice’ which purports to
restrict the use of articles lawfully sold.
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice BLACK, dissenting.
Almost a century ago, this Court asserted, and time after time thereafter it has
reasserted, that when an article described in a patent is sold and ‘passes to the
hands of a purchaser, it is no longer within the limits of the monopoly. It passes
outside of it, and is no longer under the protection of the act of Congress. * * *
Contracts in relation to it are regulated by the laws of the State, and are subject
to State jurisdiction.'
A single departure from this judicial interpretation of the patent statute was
expressly overruled within five years, and this Court again reasserted that
commodities-once sold-were not thereafter ‘subject to conditions as to use’
imposed by patent owners. In result, the judgment here is a second departure
from the traditional judicial interpretation of the patent laws.
As a consequence of the return to the interpretation of the patent statutes
previously repudiated and expressly overruled, petitioner is enjoined from
making full use of, and must account in triple damages for using, tubes and
amplifiers which he owns. He became the owner of the tubes by purchase from
various retailers authorized by respondents to sell in the open market. He
became the owner of the amplifiers by purchase from a manufacturer whohaving the complete right to make them-had contracted to sell only for limited
uses. The departure here permits the patentee-by virtue of his contract with the
manufacturer-to restrict the uses to which this purchaser and owner may put his
tubes and amplifiers.
Transformer Company was authorized by the patentee to make and to sell
amplifiers. It did make such amplifiers-of a standard type usable in may fields,
they became its property when made, were sold to and became the property of
petitioner. The prior opinion in this case, both courts below and the opinion on
this rehearing, all refer to the transaction between Transformer Company and
petitioner as a sale. Even the very contract authorizing the Transformer
Company to make and sell the amplifiers provided ‘That for the purpose of this
agreement all Licensed Apparatus shall be considered as ‘sold’ when the
Licensed Apparatus has been billed out, or if not billed out, when it has been
delivered, shipped, or mailed.'
Notice to the purchaser in any form could not-under the patent law-limit or
restrict the use of the amplifiers after they were sold and knowledge by both
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vendor and purchaser that the articles were purchased for use outside the ‘field’
for which the vendor had been given the right to sell, made the transaction
between them no less a sale. Had petitioner-after making the purchase-decided
not to use these amplifiers in the forbidden fields, or had they been destroyed
prior to such use, certainly the mere state of mind of the parties at the time of
sale would not have made them both infringers.
Indeed, petitioner could use the amplifiers at all only in combination with tubes
which it purchased on the open market from retailers authorized by respondents
to sell. Therefore, even if the state of mind of vendor and purchaser were
material, Transformer Company could be considered an infringer only because it
sold a commodity which might-depending on possible events after the sale-be . .
. in infringing combination with another lawfully purchased commodity. The
patent law was not intended to accomplish such result.
Petitioner has persistently contended throughout this litigation that no existing
trade practice permits a patentee-under guise of a ‘license’-to extend his
monopoly to commodities after sale, and has not stipulated otherwise. Neither
stipulation nor practice could justify extension of patent monopoly beyond the
limits of legality fixed by Congress and recognized by this Court for over threequarters of a century. ‘The statutory authority to grant the exclusive right to ‘use’
a patented machine is precisely the same, as the authority to grant the exclusive
right to ‘vend’ * * *.' A widespread practice of restricting the resale price of
articles described in patents did not prevent this Court from holding that once
the statutory right to vend has been exercised ‘the added restriction is beyond
the protection and purpose of the act. Similarly, a ‘common practice * * * to
grant written licenses * * * restricted to one or more * * * fields of * * * use’
cannot prevent the application of ‘that line of cases in which this court has from
the beginning held that a patentee who has parted with a patented ** machine
by passing title to a purchaser has placed the article beyond the limits of the
monopoly secured by the patent act.'
.
NOTES AND QUESTIONS
1. Since the licensee both manufactured the product under the license and
then sold it for a commercial use in violation of the field of use restriction
the Supreme Court could not find that the sale was “unauthorized” except
by finding first that the first sale doctrine did not apply to a
manufacturing license. As a result the Court distinguished between sales
of patented articles, to which the first sale rule applied, and patent
licenses granted to a license to produce. In this case the first sale
doctrine would not apply to the license to produce, although it would
apply to any restriction placed on a patented good after it had been sold.
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The same logic would apply to process, or “method,” patents. However,
in the Quanta Computer decision, reprinted infra, the Supreme Court
determined that the first-sale doctrine should be applied to a method
patent, although it did not say how. Which rule makes more sense? One
author argues that “a rule exempting method claims from exhaustion
would, in practice, marginalize the entire doctrine by allowing patent
applicants to easily preclude future adverse exhaustion defenses because
virtually any invention can be cast as a method using simple claim
drafting techniques. Thus, although method claims carry some
drawbacks, their categorical exclusion from exhaustion would reduce the
doctrine to a matter of preference and, as the Court recognized,
“seriously undermine” it.” Andrew T. Dufresne, The Exhaustion Doctrine

Revived? Assessing the Scope and Possible Effects of the Supreme
Court’s Quanta Decision, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 11, 29-30 (2009). For a
very different view, see F. Scott Kieff, Quanta v. LG Electronis:
Frustrating Patent Deals by Taking Contracting Options off the Table?”,
2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 315 (2008).

Consider this possibility: a patentee licenses another firm to manufacture
its patent widget and sell it. However, the license provides that the
licensee may manufacture (a) no more than 1000 units per year; and (2)
that all of these must be sold in the state of New York; and (3)
purchasers of the widget may use them only for personal, not business,
use. Both quantity and territory restricted manufacturing licenses are
routinely enforced, and territorial restrictions are expressly authorized by
the Patent Act. See 35 U.S.C. §261, which permits the patentee to “grant
and convey an exclusive right under his application for patent, or patents,
to the whole or any specified part of the United States.” On quantity
limitations, see United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & co., 118
F.Supp. 41, 225-226 (D.Del. 1953), aff’d on other grounds, 351 U.S. 377
(1956), which approved an arrangement that called for a stepped up
royalty on production beyond a specified amount.
See CHRISTINA
BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT: PROMOTING
LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION, Ch. 13 (2011).
What if the patentee assigns the process patent, or gives another firm
the exclusive right to manufacture, but also imposes the quantity or
geographic restriction. Now it can be said that the patentee has given up
ownership of all of the rights in the patent, just as the owner of a patent
thing has given up all rights in that particular copy of the thing. Should
the first sale doctrine apply in that case? The story is not as simple as it
might first appear if there are competing alternative technologies and the
patentee owns both of them. For example, the patentee might be
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producing under Alpha technology, but it also owns Beta technology
which is roughly as good but not being used. It then sells (assigns) the
Beta technology to another firm, but since it is in competition with this
technology it wans to limit either the number of units that Beta can make
or the territories in which Beta can be sold. If the first sale doctrine
precludes Beta by assignment, Alpha will probably simply give the other
firm a nonexclusive right to Beta. If the first sale doctrine bars both the
assignment and the nonexclusive license, the patentee will very likely
refuse to grant any license at all. As a policy matter, which rule is best?
Shouldn’t competition (antitrust) policy be relevant, at least insofar as the
Patent Act does not expressly authorize the action? We might prohibit
either the quantity limitation or the geographic limitation, but that would
conflict with long-standing practice. We could force the firm to license
patent Beta, but that appears to conflict with the Patent Misuse Reform
Act, 35 U.S.C. § 271(d), which states that a patentee may lawfully refuse
to license.
2. Note that the law of real property does not have an equivalent to the first
sale rule. Indeed, we permit restrictions to “run with the land” all the
time. For example, if I sell a piece of property to you subject to a
properly executed restriction that it not be used for commercial purposes
I will be able to enforce that restriction not only against you, but against
any subsequent purchaser who violates it. I will be able to do this even
though I am not in privity of contract with these subsequent purchasers.
By contrast, if I sell a patented computer subject to the restriction that it
not be used for commercial purposes the restriction is generally
unenforceable after the first sale occurs. What explains the difference in
policy?
UNITED STATES v. UNIVIS LENS CO.
316 U.S. 241 (1942)
Mr. Chief Justice STONE delivered the opinion of the Court.
These cases come here on direct appeal and cross appeal from a judgment of
the district court granting in part and denying in part the Government's prayer
for an injunction restraining violations of §§ 1and 3 of the Sherman Act….
Appellee, Univis Lens Company, was the owner of a number of patents and two
trademarks relating to multifocal lenses. In 1931 it organized appellee, Univis
Corporation…. [T]he Corporation then proceeded to set up and has since
maintained the licensing system which the Government now assails.
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The relevant features of the system are as follows: The Corporation licenses the
Lens Company to manufacture lens blanks and to sell them to designated
licensees of the Corporation, upon the Lens Company's payment to the
Corporation of an agreed royalty of 50 cents a pair. The lens blanks are rough
opaque pieces of glass of suitable size, design and composition for use, when
ground and polished, as multifocal lenses in eyeglasses. Each blank is composed
of two or more pieces of glass of different refractive power, of such size, shape,
and composition and so disposed that when fused together in the blank it is said
to conform to the specifications and claims of some one of the Corporation's
patents.
The Corporation also issues three classes of licenses-licenses to wholesalers, to
finishing retailers and to prescription retailers. The licenses to wholesalers
authorize the licensees to purchase the blanks from the Lens Company, to finish
them by grinding and polishing, and to sell them to prescription licensees only at
prices fixed by the Corporation licensor. In finishing the lenses so as to make
them an effective aid to vision of the prospective wearer, to whom the
prescription retailer sells, it is necessary for the wholesaler, by grinding the
blanks, to conform their curvatures to the prescription supplied by the retailer
with his order. By the terms of the license the wholesalers are required to keep
full accounts of all sales, showing the sales prices of lenses and the names of the
purchasers, and to make them available to representatives of the Corporation.
The licenses to finishing retailers-who purchase the blanks from the Lens
Company, grind and polish them and adjust the lenses, in frames or supports, to
the eyes of the consumers-contain similar provisions. The retailers are licensed
to purchase the blanks of the Lens Company and to sell them to their customers
at prices prescribed by the Corporation licensor….
The licenses to prescription retailers, who are without facilities for grinding and
finishing the lenses, but who prescribe and adjust glasses for their customers,
are signed both by the Corporation and a licensor wholesaler, and grant to the
retailer a ‘franchise to prescribe and fit Univis lenses', in return for which the
prescription retailer agrees to sell finished lenses only to consumers and only at
prices prescribed by the Corporation.
All the licenses to wholesalers and retailers recite the Corporation's ownership of
the lens patents and purport to confer on the licensee the privilege of selling the
patented invention in the manner and to the extent stated. No royalties are
exacted of any of the licensees other than the 50 cents collected by the
Corporation for each pair of blanks sold by the Lens Company. The rewards of
the corporate appellees for the exploitation of the patents and the patented
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lenses are derived wholly from the sales by the Lens Company of the blanks,
from the proceeds of which the 50 cent royalty is paid…..
For a time the Corporation licensed approximately 20 per cent of the retailers in
a locality. It now licenses a larger percentage but not more than 50 per cent.…
The district court found that the claims of each of these eight patents are for a
finished lens and that consequently the wholesalers and finishing retailers, in
grinding and polishing each lens, practice in part the patent, in conformity to
which the Lens Company has manufactured the blanks which it supplies. The
court thought that without the granted license the final step in finishing the lens
would infringe the patent and concluded that for this reason the Corporation
could condition its licenses upon the maintenance by the licensee of the
prescribed retail price. See United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476.
But it held that the prescription retailer licenses are unlawful because their
restrictions upon the resale of the finished product are not within the patent
monopoly and are proscribed by the Sherman Act….
The Government has not put in issue the validity of the lens patents, but argues
that their scope does not extend beyond the structure of the lens blanks and
consequently affords no basis for the Corporation's restrictions on the sale of the
finished lenses which the wholesalers and finishing retailers fashion from blanks
purchased from the Lens Company. It insists that the novel features of the
invention do not include more than the combination of shape, size and
arrangement of the described pieces of glass when they are fused into the blank;
that the grinding and polishing of the blank involve no practice and add no
feature not common to the finishing and ‘fitting’ of other types of multifocal
lenses which are not covered by the patents; and that their scope cannot be
lawfully extended to a procedure not in itself novel merely because it is applied
to an article which embodies the only novel features of the alleged invention,
and has by the sale become a lawful subject of commerce…..
As appellees concede, the invention of only a single lens patent is utilized in
making each blank and finishing it as a lens. We therefore put to one side
questions which might arise if the finisher of a particular lens blank utilized the
invention of some patent other than the patent which was practiced in part by
the manufacture of the blank. And we assume for present purposes, without
deciding, that the patent is not fully practiced until the finishing licensee has
ground and polished the blank so that it will serve its purpose as a lens. But
merely because the licensee takes the final step in the manufacture of the
patented product, by doing work on the blank which he has purchased from the
patentee's licensee, it does not follow that the patentee can control the price at
which the finished lens is sold.
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Notwithstanding the assumption which we have made as to the scope of the
patent, each blank, as appellees insist, embodies essential features of the
patented device and is without utility until it is ground and polished as the
finished lens of the patent. We may assume also, as appellees contend, that sale
of the blanks by an unlicensed manufacturer to an unlicensed finisher for their
completion would constitute contributory infringement by the seller.
But in any case it is plain that where the sale of the blank is by the patentee or
his licensee-here the Lens Company-to a finisher, the only use to which it could
be put and the only object of the sale is to enable the latter to grind and polish it
for use as a lens by the prospective wearer. An incident to the purchase of any
article, whether patented or unpatented, is the right to use and sell it, and upon
familiar principles the authorized sale of an article which is capable of use only in
practicing the patent is a relinquishment of the patent monopoly with respect to
the article sold…. Sale of a lens blank by the patentee or by his licensee is thus
in itself both a complete transfer of ownership of the blank, which is within the
protection of the patent law, and a license to practice the final stage of the
patent procedure. In the present case the entire consideration and compensation
for both is the purchase price paid by the finishing licensee to the Lens
Company. We have no question here of what other stipulations, for royalties or
otherwise, might have been exacted as a part of the entire transaction, which do
not seek to control the disposition of the patented article after the sale. The
question is whether the patentee or his licensee, no longer aided by the patent,
may lawfully exercise such control.
The declared purpose of the patent law is to promote the progress of science
and the useful arts by granting to the inventor a limited monopoly, the exercise
of which will enable him to secure the financial rewards for his invention…. The
full extent of the monopoly is the patentee's ‘exclusive right to make use, and
vend the invention or discovery’. The patentee may surrender his monopoly in
whole by the sale of his patent or in part by the sale of an artile embodying the
invention. His monopoly remains so long as he retains the ownership of the
patented article. But sale of it exhausts the monopoly in that article and the
patentee may not thereafter, by virtue of his patent, control the use or
disposition of the article. Hence the patentee cannot control the resale price of
patented articles which he has sold, either by resort to an infringement suit, or,
consistently with the Sherman Act, by stipulating for price maintenance by his
vendees….
We think that all the considerations which support these results lead to the
conclusion that where one has sold an uncompleted article which, because it
embodies essential features of his patented invention, is within the protection of
his patent, and has destined the article to be finished by the purchaser in
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conformity to the patent, he has sold his invention so far as it is or may be
embodied in that particular article. The reward he was demanded and received is
for the article and the invention which it embodies and which his vendee is to
practice upon it. He has thus parted with his right to assert the patent monopoly
with respect to it and is no longer free to control the price at which it may be
sold either in its unfinished or finished form. No one would doubt that if the
patentee's licensee had sold the blanks to a wholesaler or finishing retailer,
without more, the purchaser would not infringe by grinding and selling them.
The added stipulation by the patentee fixing resale prices derives no support
from the patent and must stand on the same footing under the Sherman Act as
like stipulations with respect to unpatented commodities.
Our decisions have uniformly recognized that the purpose of the patent law is
fulfilled with respect to any particular article when the patentee has received his
reward for the use of his invention by the sale of the article, and that once that
purpose is realized the patent law affords no basis for restraining the use and
enjoyment of the thing sold. Adams v. Burke…. The first vending of any article
manufactured under a patent puts the article beyond the reach of the monopoly
which that patent confers. Whether the licensee sells the patented article in its
completed form or sells it before completion for the purpose of enabling the
buyer to finish and sell it, he has equally parted with the article, and made it the
vehicle for transferring to the buyer ownership of the invention with respect to
that article. To that extent he has parted with his patent monopoly in either
case, and has received in the purchase price every benefit of that monopoly
which the patent law secures to him. If he were permitted to control the price at
which it could be sold by others he would extend his monopoly quite as much in
the one case as in the other, and he would extend it beyond the fair meaning of
the patent statutes and the construction which has hitherto been given to them.
… Accordingly neither the Lens Company nor the Corporation, by virtue of the
patents, could after the sale of the lens blank exercise any further control over
the article sold.
The price fixing features of appellees' licensing system, which are not within the
protection of the patent law, violate the Sherman Act…. Agreements for price
maintenance of articles moving in interstate commerce are, without more,
unreasonable restraints within the meaning of the Sherman Act because they
eliminate competition, and restrictions imposed by the seller upon resale prices
of articles moving in interstate commerce….
Appellees stress the features of their licensing system by which it is said they
protect the public interest and their own good will by the selection as licensees
of those who are specially skilled and competent to render the service which they
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undertake. But if we assume that such restrictions might otherwise be valid,..
these features are so interwoven with and identified with the price restrictions
which are the core of the licensing system that the case is an appropriate one for
the suppression of the entire licensing scheme even though some of its features,
independently established, might have been used for lawful purposes… The
injunction of the district court will therefore be continued….
NOTES AND QUESTIONS
1. As the previous notes have suggested, applying the “first sale” doctrine to a
manufacturing license or method patent is conceptually difficult because
regulating how a manufacturing license is used seems almost inherent in such
licenses. As a result, quantity and locational limitations are routinely enforced.
Univis represents the very interesting intermediate case of the sale of a good
coupled with a process license to alter that particular copy of the good. In that
case there are no additional limitations to specific that do not apply to the good
itself, so the Supreme Court had little difficult holding that the first sale doctrine
applied. In this case the resale price maintenance restriction applied to the
finished lens, not to the process that was used to finish it. Suppose that Univis
had simply sold the lens blanks and separately licensed a process patent for its
method of finishing blanks, but inserted in the process patent a restriction that
lenses produced by the patented process could be sold only for $25.00 each?
Alternatively, suppose that Univis did not make the lenses at all but merely
licensed a process patent providing that any lens produced with the patent be
sold at $25.00. Or suppose its process patent license stated that the licensing
royalty was 10% of the sale price, which could not be less than $25.00. Or
alternatively, suppose that it simply provided that the royalty would be $2.50 per
lens produced, but that the only way a licensee could make a profit at that
royalty rate was by charging at least $25.00 per lens?
NOTE: RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE
Resale price maintenance (RPM), sometimes known as vertical price
fixing, is a type of vertical integration by contract in which a manufacturer or
supplier regulates the price at which independent dealers resell a product. In
1911 the U.S. Supreme Court declared RPM to be unlawful per se under §1 the
Sherman Act. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
Dr. Miles Medical Company brought an equitable action seeking to enjoin the
defendant from selling Dr. Miles products at a discounted rate. The Court
concluded that restraint upon the sale of goods was invalid. Thereupon the
Supreme Court engaged in nearly a century of management of RPM, creating
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complex doctrine that was riddled with exceptions and largely economically
incoherent, given that many instances of RPM are very likely not anticompetitive.
The case law, much of which is now obsolete, is recounted in 8 PHILLIP E. AREEDA
& HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, Ch. 16 (3d ed. 2010).
In 2007, the Court overturned Dr. Miles in its Leegin decision, concluding
that RPM must be assessed under the rule of reason, which means that
anticompetitive effects must be proven in each case. Writing for the majority,
Justice Kennedy reasoned, “The justifications for vertical price restraints are
similar to those for other vertical restraints. Minimum resale price maintenance
can stimulate interbrand competition-the competition among manufacturers
selling different brands of the same type of product-by reducing intrabrand
competition-the competition among retailers selling the same brand. The
promotion of interbrand competition is important because “the primary purpose
of the antitrust laws is to protect [this type of] competition.” A single
manufacturer's use of vertical price restraints tends to eliminate intrabrand price
competition; this in turn encourages retailers to invest in tangible or intangible
services or promotional efforts that aid the manufacturer's position as against
rival manufacturers. Resale price maintenance also has the potential to give
consumers more options so that they can choose among low-price, low-service
brands; high-price, high-service brands; and brands that fall in between.” Leegin
Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. 551 U.S. 877, 890 (2007).
2, Was the Court in Univis making competition policy or patent policy? Note
that the government brought the case under the Sherman Act as a challenge to
unlawful resale price maintenance. However, the Court relied mainly on the first
sale doctrine, which comes from patent rather than antitrust law. Would the
Court have come out the same way had the restriction in question not been a
per se antitrust violation such as RPM. For example, what if the restriction in
Univis provided that each lens be sold with a set of detailed printed instructions
describing how it is to be used? What purpose related to either patent policy or
antitrust policy would require a court to condemn such a restriction?
QUANTA COMPUTER, INC. v. LG ELECTRONICS, INC.
553 U.S. 617 (2008)
Justice THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
For over 150 years this Court has applied the doctrine of patent exhaustion to
limit the patent rights that survive the initial authorized sale of a patented item.
In this case, we decide whether patent exhaustion applies to the sale of
components of a patented system that must be combined with additional
components in order to practice the patented methods. The Court of Appeals for
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the Federal Circuit held that the doctrine does not apply to method patents at all
and, in the alternative, that it does not apply here because the sales were not
authorized by the license agreement. We disagree on both scores. Because the
exhaustion doctrine applies to method patents, and because the license
authorizes the sale of components that substantially embody the patents in suit,
the sale exhausted the patents.
Respondent LG Electronics, Inc. (LGE), purchased a portfolio of computer
technology patents in 1999, including the three patents at issue here: U.S.
Patent Nos. 4,939,641 (’641); 5,379,379 (’379); and 5,077,733 (’733)
(collectively LGE Patents).
Frequently accessed data are generally stored in cache memory, which permits
faster access than main memory and is often located on the microprocessor
itself. When copies of data are stored in both the cache and main memory,
problems may arise when one copy is changed but the other still contains the
original “stale” version of the data. J. Handy, Cache Memory Book 124 (2d
ed.1993). The ‘641 patent addresses this problem….
The ’379 patent relates to the coordination of requests to read from, and write
to, main memory. Processing all read requests first ensures speedy access, but
may result in the retrieval of outdated data if a read request for a certain piece
of data is processed before an outstanding write request for the same data. The
‘379 patent discloses an efficient method of organizing read and write requests
while maintaining accuracy by allowing the computer to execute only read
requests until it needs data for which there is an outstanding write request….
The ’733 patent addresses the problem of managing the data traffic on a bus
connecting two computer components, so that no one device monopolizes the
bus. It allows multiple devices to share the bus, giving heavy users greater
access.
LGE licensed a patent portfolio, including the LGE Patents, to Intel Corporation
(Intel). The cross-licensing agreement (License Agreement) permits Intel to
manufacture and sell microprocessors and chipsets that use the LGE Patents (the
Intel Products). The License Agreement authorizes Intel to “ ‘make, use, sell
(directly or indirectly), offer to sell, import or otherwise dispose of’ ” its own
products practicing the LGE Patents….
The License Agreement purports not to alter the usual rules of patent
exhaustion, however, providing that, “ ‘[n]otwithstanding anything to the
contrary contained in this Agreement, the parties agree that nothing herein shall
in any way limit or alter the effect of patent exhaustion that would otherwise
apply when a party hereto sells any of its Licensed Products.’ ”
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In a separate agreement (Master Agreement), Intel agreed to give written notice
to its own customers informing them that, while it had obtained a broad license
“‘ensur[ing] that any Intel product that you purchase is licensed by LGE and thus
does not infringe any patent held by LGE,’ ” the license “ ‘does not extend,
expressly or by implication, to any product that you make by combining an Intel
product with any non-Intel product.’” …
Petitioners, including Quanta Computer (collectively Quanta), are a group of
computer manufacturers. Quanta purchased microprocessors and chipsets from
Intel and received the notice required by the Master Agreement. Nonetheless,
Quanta manufactured computers using Intel parts in combination with non-Intel
memory and buses in ways that practice the LGE Patents. Quanta does not
modify the Intel components and follows Intel’s specifications to incorporate the
parts into its own systems.
LGE filed a complaint against Quanta, asserting that the combination of the Intel
Products with non-Intel memory and buses infringed the LGE Patents….
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part.
It agreed that the doctrine of patent exhaustion does not apply to method
claims. In the alternative, it concluded that exhaustion did not apply because
LGE did not license Intel to sell the Intel Products to Quanta for use in
combination with non-Intel products.
The longstanding doctrine of patent exhaustion provides that the initial
authorized sale of a patented item terminates all patent rights to that item. This
Court first applied the doctrine in 19th-century cases addressing patent
extensions on the Woodworth planing machine. Purchasers of licenses to sell and
use the machine for the duration of the original patent term sought to continue
using the licenses through the extended term. The Court held that the extension
of the patent term did not affect the rights already secured by purchasers who
bought the item for use “in the ordinary pursuits of life.” Bloomer v. McQuewan,
14 How. 539, 549, (1853); see also ibid. (“[W]hen the machine passes to the
hands of the purchaser, it is no longer within the limits of the monopoly”);
Bloomer v. Millinger, 1 Wall. 340, 351, (1864). In Adams v. Burke, 17 Wall. 453,
(1873), the Court affirmed the dismissal of a patent holder’s suit alleging that a
licensee had violated postsale restrictions on where patented coffin-lids could be
used. “[W]here a person ha[s] purchased a patented machine of the patentee or
his assignee,” the Court held, “this purchase carrie[s] with it the right to the use
of that machine so long as it [is] capable of use.”
Although the Court permitted postsale restrictions on the use of a patented
article in Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912), that decision was short lived.
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In 1913, the Court refused to apply A.B. Dick to uphold price-fixing provisions in
a patent license. See Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 14-17 (1913). Shortly
thereafter, in Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502,
518 (1917), the Court explicitly overruled A.B. Dick. In that case, a patent holder
attempted to limit purchasers’ use of its film projectors to show only film made
under a patent held by the same company. The Court noted the “increasing
frequency” with which patent holders were using A.B. Dick-style licenses to limit
the use of their products and thereby using the patents to secure market control
of related, unpatented items. 243 U.S., at 509, Observing that “the primary
purpose of our patent laws is not the creation of private fortunes for the owners
of patents but is ‘to promote the progress of science and useful arts,’ ” id., at
511 (quoting U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8), the Court held that “the scope of the
grant which may be made to an inventor in a patent, pursuant to the [patent]
statute, must be limited to the invention described in the claims of his patent.”
243 U.S., at 511. Accordingly, it reiterated the rule that “the right to vend is
exhausted by a single, unconditional sale, the article sold being thereby carried
outside the monopoly of the patent law and rendered free of every restriction
which the vendor may attempt to put upon it.”
This Court most recently discussed patent exhaustion in Univis, 316 U.S. 241, on
which the District Court relied. Univis Lens Company, the holder of patents on
eyeglass lenses, licensed a purchaser to manufacture lens blanks by fusing
together different lens segments to create bi- and tri-focal lenses and to sell
them to other Univis licensees at agreed-upon rates. Wholesalers were licensed
to grind the blanks into the patented finished lenses, which they would then sell
to Univis-licensed prescription retailers for resale at a fixed rate. Finishing
retailers, after grinding the blanks into patented lenses, would sell the finished
lenses to consumers at the same fixed rate. The United States sued Univis under
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 3, 15, alleging unlawful restraints on trade.
Univis asserted its patent monopoly rights as a defense to the antitrust suit. The
Court granted certiorari to determine whether Univis’ patent monopoly survived
the sale of the lens blanks by the licensed manufacturer and therefore shielded
Univis’ pricing scheme from the Sherman Act.
The Court assumed that the Univis patents containing claims for finished lenses
were practiced in part by the wholesalers and finishing retailers who ground the
blanks into lenses, and held that the sale of the lens blanks exhausted the
patents on the finished lenses…. The Court explained that the lens blanks
“embodi[ed] essential features of the patented device and [were] without utility
until ... ground and polished as the finished lens of the patent.” The Court noted
that: “where one has sold an uncompleted article which, because it embodies
essential features of his patented invention, is within the protection of his patent,
and has destined the article to be finished by the purchaser in conformity to the
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patent, he has sold his invention so far as it is or may be embodied in that
particular article.”
In sum, the Court concluded that the traditional bar on patent restrictions
following the sale of an item applies when the item sufficiently embodies the
patent-even if it does not completely practice the patent-such that its only and
intended use is to be finished under the terms of the patent. With this history of
the patent exhaustion doctrine in mind, we turn to the parties’ arguments.
LGE argues that the exhaustion doctrine is inapplicable here because it does not
apply to method claims, which are contained in each of the LGE Patents. LGE
reasons that, because method patents are linked not to a tangible article but to a
process, they can never be exhausted through a sale. Rather, practicing the
patent-which occurs upon each use of an article embodying a method patent-is
permissible only to the extent rights are transferred in an assignment contract.
Quanta, in turn, argues that there is no reason to preclude exhaustion of method
claims, and points out that both this Court and the Federal Circuit have applied
exhaustion to method claims. It argues that any other rule would allow patent
holders to avoid exhaustion entirely by inserting method claims in their patent
specifications.
Quanta has the better of this argument. Nothing in this Court’s approach to
patent exhaustion supports LGE’s argument that method patents cannot be
exhausted. It is true that a patented method may not be sold in the same way as
an article or device, but methods nonetheless may be “embodied” in a product,
the sale of which exhausts patent rights. Our precedents do not differentiate
transactions involving embodiments of patented methods or processes from
those involving patented apparatuses or materials. To the contrary, this Court
has repeatedly held that method patents were exhausted by the sale of an item
that embodied the method. In Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S.
436, 446, 457 (1940), for example, the Court held that the sale of a motor fuel
produced under one patent also exhausted the patent for a method of using the
fuel in combustion motors. Similarly, as previously described, Univis held that the
sale of optical lens blanks that partially practiced a patent exhausted the method
patents that were not completely practiced until the blanks were ground into
lenses.
These cases rest on solid footing. Eliminating exhaustion for method patents
would seriously undermine the exhaustion doctrine. Patentees seeking to avoid
patent exhaustion could simply draft their patent claims to describe a method
rather than an apparatus. Apparatus and method claims “may approach each
other so nearly that it will be difficult to distinguish the process from the function
of the apparatus.” United States ex rel. Steinmetz v. Allen, 192 U.S. 543, 559
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(1904). By characterizing their claims as method instead of apparatus claims, or
including a method claim for the machine’s patented method of performing its
task, a patent drafter could shield practically any patented item from exhaustion.
This case illustrates the danger of allowing such an end-run around exhaustion.
On LGE’s theory, although Intel is authorized to sell a completed computer
system that practices the LGE Patents, any downstream purchasers of the
system could nonetheless be liable for patent infringement. Such a result would
violate the longstanding principle that, when a patented item is “once lawfully
made and sold, there is no restriction on [its] use to be implied for the benefit of
the patentee.” Adams, 17 Wall., at 457. We therefore reject LGE’s argument that
method claims, as a category, are never exhaustible.
We next consider the extent to which a product must embody a patent in order
to trigger exhaustion. Quanta argues that, although sales of an incomplete article
do not necessarily exhaust the patent in that article, the sale of the
microprocessors and chipsets exhausted LGE’s patents in the same way the sale
of the lens blanks exhausted the patents in Univis. Just as the lens blanks in
Univis did not fully practice the patents at issue because they had not been
ground into finished lenses, Quanta observes, the Intel Products cannot practice
the LGE Patents--or indeed, function at all--until they are combined with memory
and buses in a computer system. If, as in Univis, patent rights are exhausted by
the sale of the incomplete item, then LGE has no postsale right to require that
the patents be practiced using only Intel parts. Quanta also argues that
exhaustion doctrine will be a dead letter unless it is triggered by the sale of
components that essentially, even if not completely, embody an invention.
Otherwise, patent holders could authorize the sale of computers that are
complete with the exception of one minor step-say, inserting the microprocessor
into a socket-and extend their rights through each downstream purchaser all the
way to the end user.
LGE, for its part, argues that Univis is inapplicable here for three reasons. First, it
maintains that Univis should be limited to products that contain all the physical
aspects needed to practice the patent. On that theory, the Intel Products cannot
embody the patents because additional physical components are required before
the patents can be practiced. Second, LGE asserts that in Univis there was no
“patentable distinction” between the lens blanks and the patented finished lenses
since they were both subject to the same patent. Brief for Respondent 14 (citing
Univis, supra, at 248-252). In contrast, it describes the Intel Products as
“independent and distinct products” from the systems using the LGE Patents and
subject to “independent patents.”...
We agree with Quanta that Univis governs this case. As the Court there
explained, exhaustion was triggered by the sale of the lens blanks because their
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only reasonable and intended use was to practice the patent and because they
“embodie[d] essential features of [the] patented invention.” Each of those
attributes is shared by the microprocessors and chipsets Intel sold to Quanta
under the License Agreement.
First, Univis held that “the authorized sale of an article which is capable of use
only in practicing the patent is a relinquishment of the patent monopoly with
respect to the article sold.” The lens blanks in Univis met this standard because
they were “without utility until [they were] ground and polished as the finished
lens of the patent.” Ibid. Accordingly, “the only object of the sale [was] to enable
the [finishing retailer] to grind and polish it for use as a lens by the prospective
wearer.” Here, LGE has suggested no reasonable use for the Intel Products
other than incorporating them into computer systems that practice the LGE
Patents. Nor can we discern one: A microprocessor or chipset cannot function
until it is connected to buses and memory. And here, as in Univis, the only
apparent object of Intel’s sales to Quanta was to permit Quanta to incorporate
the Intel Products into computers that would practice the patents.
Second, the lens blanks in Univis “embodie[d] essential features of [the]
patented invention.” The essential, or inventive, feature of the Univis lens
patents was the fusing together of different lens segments to create bi- and
trifocal lenses. The finishing process performed by the finishing and prescription
retailers after the fusing was not unique. As the United States explained: “The
finishing licensees finish Univis lens blanks in precisely the same manner as they
finish all other bifocal lens blanks. Indeed, appellees have never contended that
their licensing system is supported by patents covering methods or processes
relating to the finishing of lens blanks. Consequently, it appears that appellees
perform all of the operations which contribute any claimed element of novelty to
Univis lenses.” Brief for United States in United States v. Univis Lens Co.,
O.T.1941, No. 855 etc., p. 10….
Like the Univis lens blanks, the Intel Products constitute a material part of the
patented invention and all but completely practice the patent. Here, as in Univis,
the incomplete article substantially embodies the patent because the only step
necessary to practice the patent is the application of common processes or the
addition of standard parts. Everything inventive about each patent is embodied
in the Intel Products. They control access to main and cache memory, practicing
the ‘641 and ’379 patents by checking cache memory against main memory and
comparing read and write requests. They also control priority of bus access by
various other computer components under the ‘733 patent. Naturally, the Intel
Products cannot carry out these functions unless they are attached to memory
and buses, but those additions are standard components in the system,
providing the material that enables the microprocessors and chipsets to function.
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The Intel Products were specifically designed to function only when memory or
buses are attached; Quanta was not required to make any creative or inventive
decision when it added those parts. Indeed, Quanta had no alternative but to
follow Intel’s specifications in incorporating the Intel Products into its computers
because it did not know their internal structure, which Intel guards as a trade
secret. Intel all but practiced the patent itself by designing its products to
practice the patents, lacking only the addition of standard parts.
We are unpersuaded by LGE’s attempts to distinguish Univis. First, there is no
reason to distinguish the two cases on the ground that the articles in Univis
required the removal of material to practice the patent while the Intel Products
require the addition of components to practice the patent. LGE characterizes the
lens blanks and lenses as sharing a “basic nature” by virtue of their physical
similarity, while the Intel Products embody only some of the “patentably distinct
elements and steps” involved in the LGE Patents. But we think that the nature
of the final step, rather than whether it consists of adding or deleting material, is
the relevant characteristic. In each case, the final step to practice the patent is
common and noninventive: grinding a lens to the customer’s prescription, or
connecting a microprocessor or chipset to buses or memory. The Intel Products
embody the essential features of the LGE Patents because they carry out all the
inventive processes when combined, according to their design, with standard
components.
With regard to LGE’s argument that exhaustion does not apply across patents,
we agree on the general principle: The sale of a device that practices patent A
does not, by virtue of practicing patent A, exhaust patent B. But if the device
practices patent A while substantially embodying patent B, its relationship to
patent A does not prevent exhaustion of patent B. For example, if the Univis lens
blanks had been composed of shatter-resistant glass under patent A, the blanks
would nonetheless have substantially embodied, and therefore exhausted, patent
B for the finished lenses. This case is no different. While each Intel
microprocessor and chipset practices thousands of individual patents, including
some LGE patents not at issue in this case, the exhaustion analysis is not altered
by the fact that more than one patent is practiced by the same product. The
relevant consideration is whether the Intel Products that partially practice a
patent-by, for example, embodying its essential features-exhaust that patent.
Having concluded that the Intel Products embodied the patents, we next
consider whether their sale to Quanta exhausted LGE’s patent rights. Exhaustion
is triggered only by a sale authorized by the patent holder. Univis, 316 U.S., at
249.
LGE argues that there was no authorized sale here because the License
Agreement does not permit Intel to sell its products for use in combination with
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non-Intel products to practice the LGE Patents. It cites General Talking Pictures
Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175 (1938), and General Talking Pictures
Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124 (1938), in which the manufacturer sold
patented amplifiers for commercial use, thereby breaching a license that limited
the buyer to selling the amplifiers for private and home use. The Court held that
exhaustion did not apply because the manufacturer had no authority to sell the
amplifiers for commercial use, and the manufacturer “could not convey to
petitioner what both knew it was not authorized to sell.” LGE argues that the
same principle applies here: Intel could not convey to Quanta what both knew it
was not authorized to sell, i.e., the right to practice the patents with non-Intel
parts.
LGE overlooks important aspects of the structure of the Intel-LGE transaction.
Nothing in the License Agreement restricts Intel’s right to sell its microprocessors
and chipsets to purchasers who intend to combine them with non-Intel parts. It
broadly permits Intel to “ ‘make, use, [or] sell’ ” products free of LGE’s patent
claims. To be sure, LGE did require Intel to give notice to its customers, including
Quanta, that LGE had not licensed those customers to practice its patents. But
neither party contends that Intel breached the agreement in that respect. In any
event, the provision requiring notice to Quanta appeared only in the Master
Agreement, and LGE does not suggest that a breach of that agreement would
constitute a breach of the License Agreement. Hence, Intel’s authority to sell its
products embodying the LGE Patents was not conditioned on the notice or on
Quanta’s decision to abide by LGE’s directions in that notice.
LGE points out that the License Agreement specifically disclaimed any license to
third parties to practice the patents by combining licensed products with other
components. But the question whether third parties received implied licenses is
irrelevant because Quanta asserts its right to practice the patents based not on
implied license but on exhaustion. And exhaustion turns only on Intel’s own
license to sell products practicing the LGE Patents.
Alternatively, LGE invokes the principle that patent exhaustion does not apply to
postsale restrictions on “making” an article. But this is simply a rephrasing of its
argument that combining the Intel Products with other components adds more
than standard finishing to complete a patented article. As explained above,
making a product that substantially embodies a patent is, for exhaustion
purposes, no different from making the patented article itself. In other words, no
further “making” results from the addition of standard parts-here, the buses and
memory-to a product that already substantially embodies the patent.
The License Agreement authorized Intel to sell products that practiced the LGE
Patents. No conditions limited Intel’s authority to sell products substantially
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embodying the patents. Because Intel was authorized to sell its products to
Quanta, the doctrine of patent exhaustion prevents LGE from further asserting its
patent rights with respect to the patents substantially embodied by those
products.
The authorized sale of an article that substantially embodies a patent exhausts
the patent holder’s rights and prevents the patent holder from invoking patent
law to control postsale use of the article. Here, LGE licensed Intel to practice any
of its patents and to sell products practicing those patents. Intel’s
microprocessors and chipsets substantially embodied the LGE Patents because
they had no reasonable noninfringing use and included all the inventive aspects
of the patented methods. Nothing in the License Agreement limited Intel’s ability
to sell its products practicing the LGE Patents. Intel’s authorized sale to Quanta
thus took its products outside the scope of the patent monopoly, and as a result,
LGE can no longer assert its patent rights against Quanta. Accordingly, the
judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
NOTES AND QUESTIONS
1. About a year earlier the Government had argued in the Leegin case that
the per se rule against RPM should be overruled and that all vertical
contractual restrictions should be governed by antitrust’s rule of reason. See
Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 2007 WL
173650 (Jan. 2007), Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551
U.S. 877 (2007). By contrast, in Quanta the Government submitted an
amicus brief arguing for what amounts to a per se rule against post-sale
restrictions on the sale of patented goods? See Brief of the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 2007 WL 3353102 (Nov. 2007), Quanta
Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008). Are the two
positions consistent? What policy goal other than stare decisis serves a first
sale doctrine as broad as the Court held in Quanta? See CHRISTINA BOHANNAN
& HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY AND
RIVALRY IN INNOVATION, ch. 13 (2011).
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THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE AND SELF-REPLICATING TECHNOLOGY
BOWMAN V. MONSANTO CO.
___ S.Ct. ___, 2013 WL 1942397 (May 13, 2013)
JUSTICE KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under the doctrine of patent exhaustion, the authorized sale of a
patented article gives the purchaser, or any subsequent owner, a right to use or
resell that article. Such a sale, however, does not allow the purchaser to make
new copies of the patented invention. The question in this case is whether a
farmer who buys patented seeds may reproduce them through planting and
harvesting without the patent holder’s permission. We hold that he may not.
Respondent Monsanto invented a genetic modification that enables
soybean plants to survive exposure to glyphosate, the active ingredient in many
herbicides (including Monsanto’s own Roundup). Monsanto markets soybean
seed containing this altered genetic material as Roundup Ready seed. Farmers
planting that seed can use a glyphosate-based herbicide to kill weeds without
damaging their crops. Two patents issued to Monsanto cover various aspects of
its Roundup Ready technology, including a seed incorporating the genetic
alteration.
Monsanto sells, and allows other companies to sell, Roundup Ready
soybean seeds to growers who assent to a special licensing agreement. That
agreement permits a grower to plant the purchased seeds in one (and only one)
season. He can then consume the resulting crop or sell it as a commodity,
usually to a grain elevator or agricultural processor. But under the agreement,
the farmer may not save any of the harvested soybeans for replanting, nor may
he supply them to anyone else for that purpose. These restrictions reflect the
ease of producing new generations of Roundup Ready seed. Because glyphosate
resistance comes from the seed’s genetic material, that trait is passed on from
the planted seed to the harvested soybeans: Indeed, a single Roundup Ready
seed can grow a plant containing dozens of genetically identical beans, each of
which, if replanted, can grow another such plant—and so on and so on. The
agreement’s terms prevent the farmer from co-opting that process to produce
his own Roundup Ready seeds, forcing him instead to buy from Monsanto each
season.
Petitioner Vernon Bowman is a farmer in Indiana who, it is fair to say,
appreciates Roundup Ready soybean seed. He purchased Roundup Ready each
year, from a company affiliated with Monsanto, for his first crop of the season. In
accord with the agreement just described, he used all of that seed for planting,
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and sold his entire crop to a grain elevator (which typically would resell it to an
agricultural processor for human or animal consumption).
Bowman, however, devised a less orthodox approach for his second crop
of each season. Because he thought such late-season planting “risky,” he did not
want to pay the premium price that Monsanto charges for Roundup Ready seed.
He therefore went to a grain elevator; purchased “commodity soybeans”
intended for human or animal consumption; and planted them in his fields.
Those soybeans came from prior harvests of other local farmers. And because
most of those farmers also used Roundup Ready seed, Bowman could anticipate
that many of the purchased soybeans would contain Monsanto’s patented
technology. When he applied a glyphosate-based herbicide to his fields, he
confirmed that this was so; a significant proportion of the new plants survived
the treatment, and produced in their turn a new crop of soybeans with the
Roundup Ready trait. Bowman saved seed from that crop to use in his lateseason planting the next year—and then the next, and the next, until he had
harvested eight crops in that way.
After discovering this practice, Monsanto sued Bowman for infringing its
patents on Roundup Ready seed. Bowman raised patent exhaustion as a
defense, arguing that Monsanto could not control his use of the soybeans
because they were the subject of a prior authorized sale (from local farmers to
the grain elevator).
The doctrine of patent exhaustion limits a patentee’s right to control what
others can do with an article embodying or containing an invention. Under the
doctrine, “the initial authorized sale of a patented item terminates all patent
rights to that item.” Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U. S.
617, 625 (2008). And by “exhaust[ing] the [patentee’s] monopoly” in that item,
the sale confers on the purchaser, or any subsequent owner, “the right to use
[or] sell” the thing as he sees fit. United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U. S. 241,
249–250 (1942). We have explained the basis for the doctrine as follows: “[T]he
purpose of the patent law is fulfilled with respect to any particular article when
the patentee has received his reward . . . by the sale of the article”; once that
“purpose is realized the patent law affords no basis for restraining the use and
enjoyment of the thing sold.”
Consistent with that rationale, the doctrine restricts a patentee’s rights
only as to the “particular article” sold, ibid.; it leaves untouched the patentee’s
ability to prevent a buyer from making new copies of the patented item. “[T]he
purchaser of the [patented] machine . . . does not acquire any right to construct
another machine either for his own use or to be vended to another.” Mitchell v.
Hawley, 16 Wall. 544, 548 (1873); see Wilbur-Ellis Co. v. Kuther, 377 U. S. 422,
424 (1964) (holding that a purchaser’s “reconstruction” of a patented machine
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“would impinge on the patentee’s right ‘to exclude others from making’ . . . the
article” (quoting 35 U. S. C. §154 (1964 ed.))). Rather, “a second creation” of
the patented item “call[s] the monopoly, conferred by the patent grant, into play
for a second time.” Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U. S.
336, 346 (1961). That is because the patent holder has “received his reward”
only for the actual article sold, and not for subsequent recreations of it. If the
purchaser of that article could make and sell endless copies, the patent would
effectively protect the invention for just a single sale. Bowman himself disputes
none of this analysis as a general matter: He forthrightly acknowledges the “well
settled” principle “that the exhaustion doctrine does not extend to the right to
‘make’ a new product.”
Unfortunately for Bowman, that principle decides this case against him.
Under the patent exhaustion doctrine, Bowman could resell the patented
soybeans he purchased from the grain elevator; so too he could consume the
beans himself or feed them to his animals. Monsanto, although the patent
holder, would have no business interfering in those uses of Roundup Ready
beans. But the exhaustion doctrine does not enable Bowman to make additional
patented soybeans without Monsanto’s permission (either express or implied).
And that is precisely what Bowman did. He took the soybeans he purchased
home; planted them in his fields at the time he thought best; applied glyphosate
to kill weeds (as well as any soy plants lacking the Roundup Ready trait); and
finally harvested more (many more) beans than he started with. … Because
Bowman thus reproduced Monsanto’s patented invention, the exhaustion
doctrine does not protect him.
Were the matter otherwise, Monsanto’s patent would provide scant
benefit. After inventing the Roundup Ready trait, Monsanto would, to be sure,
“receiv[e] [its] reward” for the first seeds it sells. Univis, 316 U. S., at 251. But in
short order, other seed companies could reproduce the product and market it to
growers, thus depriving Monsanto of its monopoly. And farmers themselves need
only buy the seed once, whether from Monsanto, a competitor, or (as here) a
grain elevator. The grower could multiply his initial purchase, and then multiply
that new creation, ad infinitum—each time profiting from the patented seed
without compensating its inventor. Bowman’s late-season plantings offer a prime
illustration. After buying beans for a single harvest, Bowman saved enough seed
each year to reduce or eliminate the need for additional purchases. Monsanto
still held its patent, but received no gain from Bowman’s annual production and
sale of Roundup Ready soybeans. The exhaustion doctrine is limited to the
“particular item” sold to avoid just such a mismatch between invention and
reward…..
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Bowman principally argues that exhaustion should apply here because
seeds are meant to be planted. The exhaustion doctrine, he reminds us, typically
prevents a patentee from controlling the use of a patented product following an
authorized sale. And in planting Roundup Ready seeds, Bowman continues, he is
merely using them in the normal way farmers do. Bowman thus concludes that
allowing Monsanto to interfere with that use would “creat[e] an impermissible
exception to the exhaustion doctrine” for patented seeds and other “selfreplicating technologies.”
But it is really Bowman who is asking for an unprecedented exception—to
what he concedes is the “well settled” rule that “the exhaustion doctrine does
not extend to the right to ‘make’ a new product.” Reproducing a patented article
no doubt “uses” it after a fashion. But as already explained, we have always
drawn the boundaries of the exhaustion doctrine to exclude that activity, so that
the patentee retains an undiminished right to prohibit others from making the
thing his patent protects. See, e.g., Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons, 106 U. S. 89,
93–94 (1882) (holding that a purchaser could not “use” the buckle from a
patented cotton-bale tie to “make” a new tie). That is because, once again, if
simple copying were a protected use, a patent would plummet in value after the
first sale of the first item containing the invention. The undiluted patent
monopoly, it might be said, would extend not for 20 years (as the Patent Act
promises), but for only one transaction. And that would result in less incentive
for innovation than Congress wanted. Hence our repeated insistence that
exhaustion applies only to the particular item sold, and not to reproductions….
Our holding today is limited—addressing the situation before us, rather
than every one involving a self-replicating product. We recognize that such
inventions are becoming ever more prevalent, complex, and diverse. In another
case, the article’s self-replication might occur outside the purchaser’s control. Or
it might be a necessary but incidental step in using the item for another purpose.
Cf. 17 U. S. C. §117(a)(1) (“[I]t is not [a copyright] infringement for the owner
of a copy of a computer program to make . . . another copy or adaptation of that
computer program provide[d] that such a new copy or adaptation is created as
an essential step in the utilization of the computer program”). We need not
address here whether or how the doctrine of patent exhaustion would apply in
such circumstances. In the case at hand, Bowman planted Monsanto’s patented
soybeans solely to make and market replicas of them, thus depriving the
company of the reward patent law provides for the sale of each article. Patent
exhaustion provides no haven for that conduct. We accordingly affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
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NOTES AND QUESTIONS
1. The monopoly problem in the Bowman case. One problem raised by selfreplicating technologies is that they do in fact replicate themselves, with virtually
infinite potential. Depending on the genetic characteristics of the patented
portions and the geographic range over which fertilization occurs, self-replicating
seeds might come to dominate a large region. As a result, a random purchase of
locally produced seed is highly likely to contain the patented trait, as it did in this
case. Doesn’t this mean Monsanto is effectively forcing its seed on Farmer
Bowman? Suppose you purchase a melon at the grocery store and, seeing the
hundreds of seeds in it otherwise going to waste, plant a few in the back yard.
If the melon contained one of Monsanto’s protected genes you would be guilty of
patent infringement. Under patent law it does not matter for basic infringement
that you did not know about the patent, and neither does it matter that you are
a consumer rather than commercial grower. Further, if the gene is robust you
may find it difficult to find any melons in the area whose seed you could plant.
Indeed, even if you found some “clean” seed and planted it, for many crops the
cross-fertilization process is such that you would be forbidden from planting the
second generation seed. Further, the principal value of Monsanto’s
technologically altered seed is that it is “Roundup Ready,” which means that you
can use Roundup herbicide to kill all the weeds and grass, leaving the genetically
altered plants intact. But what if you are a true back-to-the earth organic
gardener who wishes to purchase local seeds for planting and do not intend to
use Roundup or any other herbicide at all. You are still guilty of patent
infringement. Given that patent law now permits Monsanto to control the
market in this fashion, can competition (antitrust) law be brought to bear on
these practices?
Note that in the final portion of its opinion the Court limited its application,
perhaps severely, stating that it does not even reach to every self-replicating
product. The Court gives digital copyright as an example. Typically one installs
or runs software from a medium such as a CD-ROM or DVD by making a copy.
The Court states that it is taking no position on whether such self-replication is
governed by the first sale doctrine. For example, suppose you purchase
software on a CD-ROM and install it on your laptop computer. The first sale
doctrine permits you to sell the CD-ROM (although under U.S. law a separate
licensing requirement might forbid you from doing so). However, are you
entitled to sell the laptop computer without first removing the installed copy of
the program? Or suppose you burn songs from CD’s to your iPod or similar
digital music device. Can you now sell the iPod with the songs included, given
that they are “replicas” of the songs on the CD’s rather than the original CD
itself? Note that these instances of self-replication do not raise the “monopoly”
problem that Bowman does: there is little chance that the self-replicating songs
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will spread through the entire neighbood. But suppose the 300 students in a
school form an organization in which they purchase CDs and then circulate them
among their number, with each given a brief time to transfer the CD’s contents
to their iPods.
2. The “repair-reconstruction” dichotomy and the first sale doctrine. The
Bowman decision discusses the repair/reconstruction dichotomy, suggesting that
a second generation seed is certainly more than a “repair” of the original seed
and more closely akin to a “reconstruction.” As the first sale doctrine is usually
stated, one who purchases a patented product has the right to “use,” “resell” or
“repair” the product without prohibition by the patentee via an infringement suit.
See DONALD S. CHISUM, 5 CHISUM ON PATENTS §16.03[2] (a) (2013 Supp.).
However, if the purchaser “reconstructs” the patented article without a licensing
permitting it to do so, than it is reproducing or “practicing” the patent, and that
would constitute infringement. So how does one tell the difference? Suppose I
have purchased a patented bicycle with 25 parts and one of them breaks. If I
replace it I am almost certainly “repairing.” But what if 20 parts break and I
replace all 20? Or what if my belt has two parts, a patented strap and a
patented buckle. When the buckle breaks I replace it with an old buckle that I
already own? See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S.
336 (1961), which held that a purchaser’s replacement of a single unpatented
part in a patented mechanism for raising the top of a convertible automobile was
a “repair,” not “reconstruction.” See also Fuji Photo Film Co., Ltd. V. Int’l Trade
Com’n, 474 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2007), which held that when a company
refurbished used but patented cameras by putting new backs on them it was
lawfully “repairing” them. Significantly, in both Aro and Fuji the courts
emphasized that the parts that were being replaced were not separately
patented. Accord Surfco Hawaii Fin Control Sys., 264 F.3d 1062 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(replacement of broken fins on surfboard were a permissible “repair” when the
fins were not covered by a separate patent. Husky Injection Molding Sys. Ltd. V.
R & D Tool Eng’r. Co., 291 F.3d 780 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (example: replacing all
parts of a motor vehicle except its spark plugs would be “reconstruction”).
COPYRIGHT PREEMPTION
KIRTSAENG v. JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC.
133 S.CT. 1351 (2013)
BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C.J.,
and THOMAS, ALITO, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined.
Section 106 of the Copyright Act grants “the owner of copyright under
this title” certain “exclusive rights,” including the right “to distribute copies ... of
the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership.” These
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rights are qualified, however, by the application of various limitations set forth in
the…Act. Those sections…include, for example, the principle of “fair use” (§
107), permission for limited library archival reproduction, (§ 108), and the
doctrine at issue here, the “first sale” doctrine (§ 109).
Section 109(a) sets forth the “first sale” doctrine as follows:
“Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3) [the
section that grants the owner exclusive distribution rights], the
owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under
this title ... is entitled, without the authority of the copyright
owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy
or phonorecord.”...
I
Respondent, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., publishes academic textbooks.
Wiley obtains from its authors various foreign and domestic copyright
assignments, licenses and permissions—to the point that we can, for present
purposes, refer to Wiley as the relevant American copyright owner. Wiley often
assigns to its wholly owned foreign subsidiary, John Wiley & Sons (Asia) Pte Ltd.,
rights to publish, print, and sell Wiley's English language textbooks abroad. Each
copy of a Wiley Asia foreign edition will likely contain language making clear that
the copy is to be sold only in a particular country or geographical region outside
the United States.
The upshot is that there are two essentially equivalent versions of a Wiley
textbook, each version manufactured and sold with Wiley's permission: (1) an
American version printed and sold in the United States, and (2) a foreign version
manufactured and sold abroad. And Wiley makes certain that copies of the
second version state that they are not to be taken (without permission) into the
United States.
Petitioner, Supap Kirtsaeng, a citizen of Thailand, moved to the United
States in 1997 to study mathematics at Cornell University. While he was studying
in the United States, Kirtsaeng asked his friends and family in Thailand to buy
copies of foreign edition English-language textbooks at Thai book shops, where
they sold at low prices, and mail them to him in the United States. Kirtsaeng
would then sell them, reimburse his family and friends, and keep the profit.
B
In 2008 Wiley brought this federal lawsuit against Kirtsaeng for copyright
infringement. Wiley claimed that Kirtsaeng's unauthorized importation of its
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books and his later resale of those books amounted to an infringement of
Wiley's § 106(3) exclusive right to distribute as well as § 602's related import
prohibition. Kirtsaeng replied that the books he had acquired were “‘lawfully
made’” and that he had acquired them legitimately. Thus, in his view, § 109(a)'s
“first sale” doctrine permitted him to resell or otherwise dispose of the books
without the copyright owner's further permission.
The District Court held that Kirtsaeng could not assert the “first sale”
defense because, in its view, that doctrine does not apply to “foreignmanufactured goods” (even if made abroad with the copyright owner's
permission). The jury then found that Kirtsaeng had willfully infringed Wiley's
American copyrights by selling and importing without authorization copies of
eight of Wiley's copyrighted titles. And it assessed statutory damages of
$600,000 ($75,000 per work).
On appeal, a split panel of the Second Circuit agreed with the District
Court. It pointed out that § 109(a)'s “first sale” doctrine applies only to “the
owner of a particular copy ... lawfully made under this title.” And, in the
majority's view, this language means that the “first sale” doctrine does not apply
to copies of American copyrighted works manufactured abroad. A dissenting
judge thought that the words “lawfully made under this title” do not refer “to a
place of manufacture” but rather “focu[s] on whether a particular copy was
manufactured lawfully under” America's copyright statute.
We granted Kirtsaeng's petition for certiorari to consider this question in
light of different views among the Circuits....
II
We must decide whether the words “lawfully made under this title”
restrict the scope of § 109(a)'s “first sale” doctrine geographically. The Second
Circuit, the Ninth Circuit, Wiley, and the Solicitor General (as amicus) all read
those words as imposing a form of geographical limitation. The Second Circuit
held that they limit the “first sale” doctrine to particular copies “made in
territories in which the Copyright Act is law,” which (the Circuit says) are copies
“manufactured domestically,” not “outside of the United States.” 654 F.3d, at
221–222....
Kirtsaeng, however, reads the words “lawfully made under this title” as
imposing a non-geographical limitation. He says that they mean made “in
accordance with” or “in compliance with” the Copyright Act. In that case, §
109(a)'s “first sale” doctrine would apply to copyrighted works as long as their
manufacture met the requirements of American copyright law. In particular, the
doctrine would apply where, as here, copies are manufactured abroad with the
permission of the copyright owner.

34

Hovenkamp, Innovation and Competition Policy, Chapter 10
April, 2013

In our view, § 109(a)'s language, its context, and the common-law
history of the “first sale” doctrine, taken together, favor a non-geographical
interpretation. We also doubt that Congress would have intended to create the
practical copyright-related harms with which a geographical interpretation would
threaten ordinary scholarly, artistic, commercial, and consumer activities. We
consequently conclude that Kirtsaeng's nongeographical reading is the better
reading of the Act.
A
The language of § 109(a) read literally favors Kirtsaeng's nongeographical
interpretation, namely, that “lawfully made under this title” means made “in
accordance with” or “in compliance with” the Copyright Act. The language of §
109(a) says nothing about geography. The word “under” can mean “[i]n
accordance with.” 18 Oxford English Dictionary 950 (2d ed.1989). And a
nongeographical interpretation provides each word of the five-word phrase with
a distinct purpose. The first two words of the phrase, “lawfully made,” suggest
an effort to distinguish those copies that were made lawfully from those that
were not, and the last three words, “under this title,” set forth the standard of
“lawful[ness].” Thus, the nongeographical reading is simple, it promotes a
traditional copyright objective (combatting piracy), and it makes word-by-word
linguistic sense.
The geographical interpretation, however, bristles with linguistic
difficulties. It gives the word “lawfully” little, if any, linguistic work to do. (How
could a book be unlawfully “made under this title”?) It imports geography into a
statutory provision that says nothing explicitly about it. And it is far more
complex than may at first appear....
In sum, we believe that geographical interpretations create more
linguistic problems than they resolve. And considerations of simplicity and
coherence tip the purely linguistic balance in Kirtsaeng's, nongeographical, favor.
B
[W]e normally presume that the words “lawfully made under this title”
carry the same meaning when they appear in different but related sections. But
doing so here produces surprising consequences. Consider:
(2) Section 109(e) specifically provides that the owner of a particular
copy of a copyrighted video arcade game “lawfully made under this title” may
“publicly perform or display that game in coin-operated equipment” without the
authorization of the copyright owner. To interpret these words geographically
means that an arcade owner could not (“without the authority of the copyright
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owner”) perform or display arcade games (whether new or used) originally made
in Japan.
(3) Section 110(1) says that a teacher, without the copyright owner's
authorization, is allowed to perform or display a copyrighted work (say, an
audiovisual work) “in the course of face-to-face teaching activities”—unless the
teacher knowingly used “a copy that was not lawfully made under this title.” To
interpret these words geographically would mean that the teacher could not
(without further authorization) use a copy of a film during class if the copy was
lawfully made in Canada, Mexico, Europe, Africa, or Asia.
C
A relevant canon of statutory interpretation favors a nongeographical
reading. “[W]hen a statute covers an issue previously governed by the common
law,” we must presume that “Congress intended to retain the substance of the
common law.” Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S.Ct. 2278, 2289–2290, n. 13 (2010).
The “first sale” doctrine is a common-law doctrine with an impeccable
historic pedigree. In the early 17th century Lord Coke explained the common
law's refusal to permit restraints on the alienation of chattels:
“[If] a man be possessed of ... a horse, or of any other
chattell ... and give or sell his whole interest ... therein upon
condition that the Donee or Vendee shall not alien[ate] the same,
the [condition] is voi[d], because his whole interest ... is out of
him, so as he hath no possibilit[y] of a Reverter, and it is against
Trade and Traffi[c], and bargaining and contracting betwee[n]
man and man: and it is within the reason of our Author that it
should ouster him of all power given to him.” 1 E. Coke, Institutes
of the Laws of England § 360, p. 223 (1628).
A law that permits a copyright holder to control the resale or other
disposition of a chattel once sold is similarly “against Trade and Traffi[c], and
bargaining and contracting.” Ibid.
With these last few words, Coke emphasizes the importance of leaving
buyers of goods free to compete with each other when reselling or otherwise
disposing of those goods. American law too has generally thought that
competition, including freedom to resell, can work to the advantage of the
consumer. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551
U.S. 877, 886 (2007) (restraints with “manifestly anticompetitive effects” are per
se illegal; others are subject to the rule of reason (internal quotation marks
omitted)); 1 P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 100, p. 4 (3d ed. 2006)
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(“[T]he principal objective of antitrust policy is to maximize consumer welfare by
encouraging firms to behave competitively”).
D
Associations of libraries, used-book dealers, [and] technology companies
point to various ways in which a geographical interpretation would fail to further
basic constitutional copyright objectives, in particular “promot[ing] the Progress
of Science and useful Arts.” U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
The American Library Association tells us that library collections contain at
least 200 million books published abroad (presumably, many were first published
in one of the nearly 180 copyright-treaty nations and enjoy American copyright
protection); that many others were first published in the United States but
printed abroad because of lower costs; and that a geographical interpretation will
likely require the libraries to obtain permission (or at least create significant
uncertainty) before circulating or otherwise distributing these books.
How, the American Library Association asks, are the libraries to obtain
permission to distribute these millions of books? How can they find, say, the
copyright owner of a foreign book, perhaps written decades ago? They may not
know the copyright holder's present address. And, even where addresses can be
found, the costs of finding them, contacting owners, and negotiating may be
high indeed. Are the libraries to stop circulating or distributing or displaying the
millions of books in their collections that were printed abroad?
Used-book dealers tell us that, from the time when Benjamin Franklin and
Thomas Jefferson built commercial and personal libraries of foreign books,
American readers have bought used books published and printed abroad. The
dealers say that they have “operat[ed] ... for centuries” under the assumption
that the “first sale” doctrine applies. But under a geographical interpretation a
contemporary tourist who buys, say, at Shakespeare and Co. (in Paris), a dozen
copies of a foreign book for American friends might find that she had violated the
copyright law. The used-book dealers cannot easily predict what the foreign
copyright holder may think about a reader's effort to sell a used copy of a novel.
And they believe that a geographical interpretation will injure a large portion of
the used-book business.
Technology companies tell us that “automobiles, microwaves, calculators,
mobile phones, tablets, and personal computers” contain copyrightable software
programs or packaging. Many of these items are made abroad with the American
copyright holder's permission and then sold and imported (with that permission)
to the United States. A geographical interpretation would prevent the resale of,
say, a car, without the permission of the holder of each copyright on each piece
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of copyrighted automobile software. Yet there is no reason to believe that
foreign auto manufacturers regularly obtain this kind of permission from their
software component suppliers.
These examples…help explain why Lord Coke considered the “first sale”
doctrine necessary to protect “Trade and Traffi[c], and bargaining and
contracting,” and they help explain why American copyright law has long applied
that doctrine.
[R]eliance upon the “first sale” doctrine is deeply embedded in the
practices of those, such as booksellers, libraries, museums, and retailers, who
have long relied upon its protection. Museums, for example, are not in the habit
of asking their foreign counterparts to check with the heirs of copyright owners
before sending, e.g., a Picasso on tour. That inertia means a dramatic change is
likely necessary before these institutions, instructed by their counsel, would
begin to engage in the complex permission-verifying process that a geographical
interpretation would demand. And this Court's adoption of the geographical
interpretation could provide that dramatic change.
Thus, we believe that the practical problems that petitioner and his amici
have described are too serious, too extensive, and too likely to come about for
us to dismiss them as insignificant—particularly in light of the ever-growing
importance of foreign trade to America.
III
Wiley and the dissent make several additional important arguments in
favor of the geographical interpretation. First, they say that our Quality
King decision strongly supports its geographical interpretation. In that case we
asked whether the Act's “importation provision,” now § 602(a)(1), barred
importation (without permission) of a copyrighted item (labels affixed to hair
care products) where an American copyright owner authorized the first sale and
export of hair care products with copyrighted labels made in the United States,
and where a buyer sought to import them back into the United States without
the copyright owner's permission. 523 U.S., at 138–139.
We held that the importation provision did not prohibit sending the
products back into the United States (without the copyright owner's permission).
We pointed out that [§ 602(a)(1)] makes importation an infringement of
the “exclusive right to distribute ... under 106.” We noted that § 109(a)'s “first
sale” doctrine limits the scope of the § 106 exclusive distribution right. We took
as given the fact that the products at issue had at least once been sold. And we
held that consequently, importation of the copyrighted labels does not violate §
602(a)(1). 523 U.S., at 145.
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In reaching this conclusion we endorsed Bobbs–Merrill and its statement
that the copyright laws were not “intended to create a right which would permit
the holder of the copyright to fasten, by notice in a book ... a restriction upon
the subsequent alienation of the subject-matter of copyright after the owner had
parted with the title to one who had acquired full dominion over it.” 210 U.S., at
349–350.
We also explained why we rejected the claim that our interpretation
would make § 602(a)(1) pointless. Under Quality King's interpretation, §
602(a)(1) would still forbid importing (without permission, and subject to the
exceptions in § 602(a)(3)) copies lawfully made abroad, for example, where (1)
a foreign publisher operating as the licensee of an American publisher prints
copies of a book overseas but, prior to any authorized sale, seeks to send them
to the United States; (2) a foreign printer or other manufacturer (if not the
“owner” for purposes of § 109(a), e.g., before an authorized sale) sought to
send copyrighted goods to the United States; (3) “a book publisher transports
copies to a wholesaler” and the wholesaler (not yet the owner) sends them to
the United States; or (4) a foreign film distributor, having leased films for
distribution, or any other licensee, consignee, or bailee sought to send them to
the United States. These examples show that § 602(a)(1) retains significance.

Second, Wiley and the dissent argue…that the Act's legislative history

supports their interpretation. But the historical events to which it points took
place more than a decade before the enactment of the Act and, at best, are
inconclusive.

Third, Wiley and the dissent claim that a nongeographical interpretation
will make it difficult, perhaps impossible, for publishers (and other copyright
holders) to divide foreign and domestic markets. We concede that is so. A
publisher may find it more difficult to charge different prices for the same book
in different geographic markets. But we do not see how these facts help Wiley,
for we can find no basic principle of copyright law that suggests that publishers
are especially entitled to such rights.
The Constitution describes the nature of American copyright law by
providing Congress with the power to “secur[e]” to “[a]uthors” “for limited
[t]imes” the “exclusive [r]ight to their ... [w]ritings.” Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The
Founders, too, discussed the need to grant an author a limited right to exclude
competition. Compare Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 31,
1788), in 13 Papers of Thomas Jefferson 440, 442–443 (J. Boyd ed. 1956)
(arguing against any monopoly) with Letter from James Madison to Thomas
Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 14 id., at 16, 21 (J. Boyd ed. 1958) (arguing for a
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limited monopoly to secure production). But the Constitution's language nowhere
suggests that its limited exclusive right should include a right to divide markets
or a concomitant right to charge different purchasers different prices for the
same book, say to increase or to maximize gain. We have found no precedent
suggesting a legal preference for interpretations of copyright statutes that would
provide for market divisions.
To the contrary, Congress enacted a copyright law that (through the “first
sale” doctrine) limits copyright holders' ability to divide domestic markets. And
that limitation is consistent with antitrust laws that ordinarily forbid market
divisions. Cf. Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49–50 (1990) (per curiam)
(“[A]greements between competitors to allocate territories to minimize
competition are illegal”).

Fourth, the dissent and Wiley contend that our decision launches United

States copyright law into an unprecedented regime of “international exhaustion.”
But they point to nothing indicative of congressional intent in 1976. The dissent
also claims that it is clear that the United States now opposes adopting such a
regime, but the Solicitor General as amicus has taken no such position in this
case. In fact, when pressed at oral argument, the Solicitor General stated that
the consequences of Wiley's reading of the statute (perpetual downstream
control) were “worse” than those of Kirtsaeng's reading (restriction of market
segmentation).
IV
For these reasons we conclude that the considerations supporting
Kirtsaeng's nongeographical interpretation of the words “lawfully made under
this title” are the more persuasive. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

It is so ordered.
[A concurring opinion by Justice KAGAN, Justice ALITO concurring, is
omitted]
Justice GINSBURG, with whom Justice KENNEDY joins, and with whom
Justice SCALIA joins except as to Parts III and V–B–1, dissenting.
... Instead of adhering to the Legislature's design, the Court today
adopts an interpretation of the Copyright Act at odds with Congress' aim to
protect copyright owners against the unauthorized importation of low-priced,
foreign-made copies of their copyrighted works. The Court's bold departure from
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Congress' design is all the more stunning, for it places the United States at the
vanguard of the movement for “international exhaustion” of copyrights.
To justify a holding that shrinks to insignificance copyright protection
against the unauthorized importation of foreign-made copies, the Court identifies
several “practical problems.” The Court's parade of horribles, however, is largely
imaginary.
I
Because economic conditions and demand for particular goods vary
across the globe, copyright owners have a financial incentive to charge different
prices for copies of their works in different geographic regions. Their ability to
engage in such price discrimination, however, is undermined if arbitrageurs are
permitted to import copies from low-price regions and sell them in high-price
regions.
In Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S.
135, 143–154 (1998), the Court held that a copyright owner's right to control
importation under § 602(a)(1) is a component of the distribution right set forth
in § 106(3) and is therefore subject to § 109(a)'s codification of the first sale
doctrine. Important to the Court's holding, the copies at issue in Quality King had
been “‘lawfully made under [Title 17]’”—a prerequisite for application of §
109(a). Section 602(a)(1), the Court noted, would apply to “copies that were
‘lawfully made’ not under the United States Copyright Act, but instead, under the
law of some other country.”
As the District Court and the Court of Appeals concluded, application of
the Quality King analysis to the facts of this case would preclude any invocation
of § 109(a). Petitioner Supap Kirtsaeng imported and then sold at a profit over
600 copies of copyrighted textbooks printed outside the United States by the
Asian subsidiary of respondent John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (Wiley). In the words the
Court used in Quality King, these copies “were ‘lawfully made’ not under the
United States Copyright Act, but instead, under the law of some other country.”
Section 109(a) therefore does not apply, and Kirtsaeng's unauthorized
importation constitutes copyright infringement under § 602(a)(1).
II
The text of the Copyright Act demonstrates that Congress intended to
provide copyright owners with a potent remedy against the importation of
foreign-made copies of their copyrighted works. As the Court recognizes, this
case turns on the meaning of the phrase “lawfully made under this title” in §
109(a). In my view, that phrase is most sensibly read as referring to instances in
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which a copy's creation is governed by, and conducted in compliance with, Title
17 of the U.S. Code.
Section 109(a), properly read, affords Kirtsaeng no defense against
Wiley's claim of copyright infringement. The Copyright Act, it has been observed
time and again, does not apply extraterritorially. The printing of Wiley's foreignmanufactured textbooks therefore was not governed by Title 17. The textbooks
thus were not “lawfully made under [Title 17],” the crucial precondition for
application of § 109(a). And if § 109(a) does not apply, there is no dispute that
Kirtsaeng's conduct constituted copyright infringement under § 602(a)(1).
Not only does the Court adopt an unnatural construction of the § 109(a)
phrase “lawfully made under this title.” Concomitantly, the Court reduces §
602(a)(1) to insignificance.
IV
Unlike the Court's holding, my position is consistent with the stance the
United States has taken in international-trade negotiations. This case bears on
the highly contentious trade issue of interterritorial exhaustion. The issue arises
because intellectual property law is territorial in nature, which means that
creators of intellectual property “may hold a set of parallel” intellectual property
rights under the laws of different nations. Chiappetta, The Desirability of
Agreeing to Disagree: The WTO, TRIPS, International IPR Exhaustion and a Few
Other Things, 21 Mich. J. Int'l L. 333, 340–341 (2000). There is no international
consensus on whether the sale in one country of a good incorporating protected
intellectual property exhausts the intellectual property owner's right to control
the distribution of that good elsewhere.
Even if the text and history of the Copyright Act were ambiguous on the
answer to the question this case presents—which they are not, see Parts II–III—
I would resist a holding out of accord with the firm position the United States has
taken on exhaustion in international negotiations. While the Government has
urged our trading partners to refrain from adopting international-exhaustion
regimes that could benefit consumers within their borders but would impact
adversely on intellectual-property producers in the United States, the Court
embraces an international-exhaustion rule that could benefit U.S. consumers but
would likely disadvantage foreign holders of U.S. copyrights.
V
A
The Court asserts that its holding “is consistent with antitrust laws that
ordinarily forbid market divisions.” Section 602(a)(1), however, read as I do and
as the Government does, simply facilitates copyright owners' efforts to impose
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“vertical restraints” on distributors of copies of their works. See generally Leegin
Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (discussing
vertical restraints). We have held that vertical restraints are not per se illegal
under § 1 of the Sherman Act because such “restraints can have procompetitive
effects.” 551 U.S., at 881–882.1
B
The Court sees many “horribles” following from a holding that the §
109(a) phrase “lawfully made under this title” does not encompass foreign-made
copies. If § 109(a) excluded foreign-made copies, the Court fears, then copyright
owners could exercise perpetual control over the downstream distribution or
public display of such copies. A ruling in Wiley's favor, the Court asserts, would
shutter libraries, put used-book dealers out of business, cripple art museums,
and prevent the resale of a wide range of consumer goods, from cars to
calculators. Copyright law and precedent, however, erect barriers to the
anticipated horribles.
1
Recognizing that foreign-made copies fall outside the ambit of §
109(a) would not mean they are forever free of the first sale doctrine. As earlier
observed, the Court stated that doctrine initially in its 1908 Bobbs–Merrill
decision. At that time, no statutory provision expressly codified the first sale
doctrine. Instead, copyright law merely provided that copyright owners had “the
sole liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing, completing, copying, executing,
finishing, and vending” their works. Copyright Act of 1891, § 1, 26 Stat. 1107.
In Bobbs–Merrill, the Court addressed the scope of the statutory right to
“ven[d].” In granting that right, the Court held, Congress did not intend to
permit copyright owners “to fasten ... a restriction upon the subsequent
alienation of the subject-matter of copyright after the owner had parted with the
title to one who had acquired full dominion over it and had given a satisfactory
1

Despite the Court's suggestion to the contrary, this case in no way
implicates the per se antitrust prohibition against horizontal “‘[a]greements
between competitors to allocate territories to minimize competition.’” Ante, at ––
–– (quoting Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49 (1990) (per curiam)).
Wiley is not requesting authority to enter into collusive agreements with other
textbook publishers that would, for example, make Wiley the exclusive supplier
of textbooks on particular subjects within particular geographic regions. Instead,
Wiley asserts no more than the prerogative to impose vertical restraints on the
distribution of its own textbooks. See Hovenkamp, Post–Sale Restraints and
Competitive Harm: The First Sale Doctrine in Perspective, 66 N.Y.U. Ann. Survey
Am. L. 487, 488 (2011) (“vertical restraints” include “limits [on] the way a seller's
own product can be distributed”).
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price for it.” 210 U.S., at 349–350. “[O]ne who has sold a copyrighted article ...
without restriction,” the Court explained, “has parted with all right to control the
sale of it.”
Under the logic of Bobbs–Merrill, the sale of a foreign-manufactured copy
in the United States carried out with the copyright owner's authorization would
exhaust the copyright owner's right to “vend” that copy. The copy could
thenceforth be resold, lent out, or otherwise redistributed without further
authorization from the copyright owner. Thus, in accord with Bobbs–Merrill, the
first authorized distribution of a foreign-made copy in the United States exhausts
the copyright owner's distribution right under § 106(3). After such an authorized
distribution, a library may lend, or a used-book dealer may resell, the foreignmade copy without seeking the copyright owner's permission.
[I]f Wiley, rather than Kirtsaeng, had imported into the United States and
then sold the foreign-made textbooks at issue in this case, Wiley's §
106(3) distribution right would have been exhausted under the rationale
of Bobbs–Merrill. Purchasers of the textbooks would thus be free to dispose of
the books as they wished without first gaining a license from Wiley.
2
Other statutory prescriptions provide further protection against the
absurd
consequences
imagined
by
the
Court.
For
example, §
602(a)(3)(C) permits “an organization operated for scholarly, educational, or
religious purposes” to import, without the copyright owner's authorization, up to
five foreign-made copies of a non-audiovisual work—notably, a book—for “library
lending or archival purposes.”
VI
To recapitulate, the objective of statutory interpretation is “to give effect
to the intent of Congress.” American Trucking Assns., 310 U.S., at 542. Here,
two congressional aims are evident. First, in enacting § 602(a)(1), Congress
intended to grant copyright owners permission to segment international markets
by barring the importation of foreign-made copies into the United States.
Second, as codification of the first sale doctrine underscores, Congress did not
want the exclusive distribution right conferred in § 106(3) to be boundless.
Instead of harmonizing these objectives, the Court subordinates the first entirely
to the second. It is unsurprising that none of the three major treatises on U.S.
copyright law embrace the Court's construction of § 109(a). See 2 Nimmer §
8.12[B][6][c], at 8–184.34 to 8–184.35; 2 Goldstein § 7.6.1.2(a), at 7:141; 4
Patry §§ 13:22, 13:44, 13:44.10.
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Rather than adopting the very international-exhaustion rule the United
States has consistently resisted in international-trade negotiations, I would
adhere to the national-exhaustion framework set by the Copyright Act's text and
history. Under that regime, codified in § 602(a)(1), Kirtsaeng's unauthorized
importation of the foreign-made textbooks involved in this case infringed Wiley's
copyrights. I would therefore affirm the Second Circuit's judgment.
NOTE
The Supreme Court first applied the first-sale doctrine to copyright law in BobbsMerrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908) . Bobbs-Merrill was a publishing
company that sold Hallie Erminie Rives’ The Castaway, a copyrighted novel, with
a notice instructing vendors not to sell the novel for less than $1. The defendants
purchased a large number of the books wholesale and sold the individual books
at 89 cents a copy. Publisher Bobbs-Merrill then brought suit. The Supreme
Court held:
The precise question, therefore, in this case is, Does the sole right to
vend . . . secure to the owner of the copyright the right, after a sale of the
book to a purchaser, to restrict future sales of the book at retail, to the right
to sell it at a certain price per copy, because of a notice in the book that a
sale at a different price will be treated as an infringement, which notice has
been brought home to one undertaking to sell for less than the named sum?
. . . In our view the copyright statutes, while protecting the owner of the
copyright in his right to multiply and sell his production, do not create the
right to impose, by notice, such as is disclosed in this case, a limitation at
which the book shall be sold at retail by future purchasers, with whom there
is no privity of contract.”
Note that Bobbs-Merrill, just as Univis, was a resale price maintenance case. In
this case, however, the Supreme Court had not yet applied the antitrust laws to
resale price maintenance. The Dr. Miles decision which declared RPM to be
unlawful per se came three years later. The Court relied strictly on copyright law
and borrowed from patent law’s first sale doctrine.
This case established the notion that a copyright owner can control the
initial sale of a work but cannot put further restraints on the works use or
transfer. It is important to note that the limitation of the first sale doctrine only
applies to transfers to title. If a copyright holder leases his or her work, the
mere possession does not fall under the first sale doctrine. Additionally, the
limitation on restrictions does not extend to derivative works; the copyright
holder still has the sole right to create derivative works. See Ivy Choderker, The
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First Sale Doctrine Defense as a Limit on the Right of Publicity: Allison v. Vintage
Sports Plaques, 19 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 413 (1999). The holding in Bobbs-Merrill
was codified in § 109(a) of the 1976 Copyright Act.

VERNOR V. AUTODESK, INC.
621 F3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010)
CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge:
Timothy Vernor purchased several used copies of Autodesk, Inc.'s AutoCAD
Release 14 software (“Release 14”) from one of Autodesk's direct customers, and
he resold the Release 14 copies on eBay. Vernor brought this declaratory
judgment action against Autodesk to establish that these resales did not infringe
Autodesk's copyright. The district court issued the requested declaratory
judgment, holding that Vernor's sales were lawful because of two of the
Copyright Act's affirmative defenses that apply to owners of copies of
copyrighted works, the first sale doctrine and the essential step defense.
Autodesk distributes Release 14 pursuant to a limited license agreement in
which it reserves title to the software copies and imposes significant use and
transfer restrictions on its customers. We determine that Autodesk's direct
customers are licensees of their copies of the software rather than owners, which
has two ramifications. Because Vernor did not purchase the Release 14 copies
from an owner, he may not invoke the first sale doctrine, and he also may not
assert an essential step defense on behalf of his customers. For these reasons,
we vacate the district court's grant of summary judgment to Vernor and remand
for further proceedings.
The material facts are not in dispute. Autodesk makes computer-aided design
software used by architects, engineers, and manufacturers. It has more than
nine million customers. It first released its AutoCAD software in 1982. It holds
registered copyrights in all versions of the software including the discontinued
Release 14 version, which is at issue in this case. It provided Release 14 to
customers on CD-ROMs.
Since at least 1986, Autodesk has offered AutoCAD to customers pursuant to
an accompanying software license agreement (“SLA”), which customers must
accept before installing the software. A customer who does not accept the SLA
can return the software for a full refund. Autodesk offers SLAs with different
terms for commercial, educational institution, and student users. The commercial
license, which is the most expensive, imposes the fewest restrictions on users
and allows them software upgrades at discounted prices.
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The SLA for Release 14 first recites that Autodesk retains title to all copies.
Second, it states that the customer has a nonexclusive and nontransferable
license to use Release 14. Third, it imposes transfer restrictions, prohibiting
customers from renting, leasing, or transferring the software without Autodesk's
prior consent and from electronically or physically transferring the software out
of the Western Hemisphere. Fourth, it imposes significant use restrictions:

YOU MAY NOT: (1) modify, translate, reverse-engineer, decompile, or
disassemble the Software ... (3) remove any proprietary notices, labels, or
marks from the Software or Documentation; (4) use ... the Software outside
of the Western Hemisphere; (5) utilize any computer software or hardware
designed to defeat any hardware copy-protection device, should the software
you have licensed be equipped with such protection; or (6) use the Software
for commercial or other revenue-generating purposes if the Software has
been licensed or labeled for educational use only.
Fifth, the SLA provides for license termination if the user copies the software
without authorization or does not comply with the SLA's restrictions. Finally, the
SLA provides that if the software is an upgrade of a previous version:

[Y]ou must destroy the software previously licensed to you, including any
copies resident on your hard disk drive ... within sixty (60) days of the
purchase of the license to use the upgrade or update.... Autodesk reserves
the right to require you to show satisfactory proof that previous copies of the
software have been destroyed.
Autodesk takes measures to enforce these license requirements. It assigns a
serial number to each copy of AutoCAD and tracks registered licensees. It
requires customers to input “activation codes” within one month after installation
to continue using the software. The customer obtains the code by providing the
product's serial number to Autodesk. Autodesk issues the activation code after
confirming that the serial number is authentic, the copy is not registered to a
different customer, and the product has not been upgraded. Once a customer
has an activation code, he or she may use it to activate the software on
additional computers without notifying Autodesk.
Vernor has sold more than 10,000 items on eBay. In May 2005, he purchased
an authentic used copy of Release 14 at a garage sale from an unspecified seller.
He never agreed to the SLA's terms, opened a sealed software packet, or
installed the Release 14 software. Though he was aware of the SLA's existence,
he believed that he was not bound by its terms. He posted the software copy for
sale on eBay.
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Autodesk filed a Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) take-down
notice with eBay claiming that Vernor's sale infringed its copyright, and eBay
terminated Vernor's auction. Autodesk advised Vernor that it conveyed its
software copies pursuant to non-transferable licenses, and resale of its software
was copyright infringement. Vernor filed a DMCA counter-notice with eBay
contesting the validity of Autodesk's copyright claim. Autodesk did not respond to
the counter-notice. eBay reinstated the auction, and Vernor sold the software to
another eBay user….
In August 2007, Vernor brought a declaratory action against Autodesk to
establish that his resales of used Release 14 software are protected by the first
sale doctrine and do not infringe Autodesk's copyright. He also sought damages
and injunctive relief….
Copyright is a federal law protection provided to the authors of “original
works of authorship,” including software programs. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-103. The
Copyright Act confers several exclusive rights on copyright owners, including the
exclusive rights to reproduce their works and to distribute their works by sale or
rental. Id. § 106(1), (3). The exclusive distribution right is limited by the first sale
doctrine, an affirmative defense to copyright infringement that allows owners of
copies of copyrighted works to resell those copies. The exclusive reproduction
right is limited within the software context by the essential step defense, another
affirmative defense to copyright infringement that is discussed further infra. Both
of these affirmative defenses are unavailable to those who are only licensed to
use their copies of copyrighted works.
This case requires us to decide whether Autodesk sold Release 14 copies to
its customers or licensed the copies to its customers. If CTA owned its copies of
Release 14, then both its sales to Vernor and Vernor's subsequent sales were
non-infringing under the first sale doctrine. However, if Autodesk only licensed
CTA to use copies of Release 14, then CTA's and Vernor's sales of those copies
are not protected by the first sale doctrine and would therefore infringe
Autodesk's exclusive distribution right.
The Supreme Court articulated the first sale doctrine in 1908, holding that a
copyright owner's exclusive distribution right is exhausted after the owner's first
sale of a particular copy of the copyrighted work. See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v.
Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350-51 (1908). In Bobbs-Merrill, the plaintiff-copyright
owner sold its book with a printed notice announcing that any retailer who sold
the book for less than one dollar was responsible for copyright
infringement. Plaintiff sought injunctive relief against defendants-booksellers who
failed to comply with the price restriction. The Supreme Court rejected the
plaintiff's claim, holding that its exclusive distribution right applied only to first
sales of copies of the work. The distribution right did not permit plaintiff to
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dictate that subsequent sales of the work below a particular price were
infringing. Id. The Court noted that its decision solely applied to the rights of a
copyright owner that distributed its work without a license agreement. Id. at 350
(“There is no claim in this case of contract limitation, nor license agreement
controlling the subsequent sales of the book.”).
Congress codified the first sale doctrine the following year. See 17 U.S.C. §
41 (1909). In its current form, it allows the “owner of a particular copy” of a
copyrighted work to sell or dispose of his copy without the copyright owner's
authorization….
[When] a transferee receives a particular copy of a copyrighted work
pursuant to a written agreement, we consider all of the provisions of the
agreement to determine whether the transferee became an owner of the copy or
received a license. We may consider (1) whether the agreement was labeled a
license and (2) whether the copyright owner retained title to the copy, required
its return or destruction, forbade its duplication, or required the transferee to
maintain possession of the copy for the agreement's duration. We did not find
any one factor dispositive….
The enforcement of copyright owners' exclusive right to reproduce their work
under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), has posed special challenges in the
software context. In order to use a software program, a user's computer will
automatically copy the software into the computer's random access memory
(“RAM”), which is a form of computer data storage. Congress enacted
the essential step defense to codify that a software user who is the “owner of a
copy” of a copyrighted software program does not infringe by making a copy of
the computer program, if the new copy is “created as an essential step in the
utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and ... is used
in no other manner.” …
In Wall Data, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Dept., 447 F.3d 769 (9th
Cir. 2006), the plaintiff sold 3,663 software licenses to the defendant. . The
licenses (1) were non-exclusive; (2) permitted use of the software on a single
computer; and (3) permitted transfer of the software once per month, if the
software was removed from the original computer. The defendant installed the
software onto 6,007 computers via hard drive imaging, which saved it from
installing the software manually on each computer. It made an unverified claim
that only 3,663 users could simultaneously access the software.
The plaintiff sued for copyright infringement, contending that the defendant
violated the license by “over-installing” the software. The defendant raised an
essential step defense, contending that its hard drive imaging was a necessary
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step of installation. On appeal, we held that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying the defendant's request for a jury instruction on the
essential step defense. Citing MAI, we held that the essential step defense does
not apply where the copyright owner grants the user a license and significantly
restricts the user's ability to transfer the software. Since the plaintiff's license
imposed “significant restrictions” on the defendant's software rights, the
defendant was a licensee and was not entitled to the essential step defense….
[Wall Data and other decisions] prescribe three considerations that we may
use to determine whether a software user is a licensee, rather than an owner of
a copy. First, we consider whether the copyright owner specifies that a user is
granted a license. Second, we consider whether the copyright owner significantly
restricts the user's ability to transfer the software. Finally, we consider whether
the copyright owner imposes notable use restrictions.
The district court [held] that a first sale occurs whenever the transferee is
entitled to keep the copy of the work. Since Autodesk does not require its
customers to return their copies of Release 14, the district court found that
Autodesk had sold Release 14 to CTA. It reasoned that thus, CTA and Vernor
were successive “owner[s] of a copy” of the software and were entitled to resell
it under the first sale doctrine. The district court also found that Vernor's
customers' copying of software during installation was protected by the essential
step defense.
We hold today that a software user is a licensee rather than an owner of a
copy where the copyright owner (1) specifies that the user is granted a license;
(2) significantly restricts the user's ability to transfer the software; and (3)
imposes notable use restrictions. Applying our holding to Autodesk's SLA, we
conclude that CTA was a licensee rather than an owner of copies of Release 14
and thus was not entitled to invoke the first sale doctrine or the essential step
defense.
Autodesk retained title to the software and imposed significant transfer
restrictions: it stated that the license is nontransferable, the software could not
be transferred or leased without Autodesk's written consent, and the software
could not be transferred outside the Western Hemisphere. The SLA also imposed
use restrictions against the use of the software outside the Western Hemisphere
and against modifying, translating, or reverse-engineering the software,
removing any proprietary marks from the software or documentation, or
defeating any copy protection device. Furthermore, the SLA provided for
termination of the license upon the licensee's unauthorized copying or failure to
comply with other license restrictions. Thus, because Autodesk reserved title to
Release 14 copies and imposed significant transfer and use restrictions, we
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conclude that its customers are licensees of their copies of Release 14 rather
than owners.
CTA was a licensee rather than an “owner of a particular copy” of Release
14, and it was not entitled to resell its Release 14 copies to Vernor under the first
sale doctrine. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a). Therefore, Vernor did not receive title to the
copies from CTA and accordingly could not pass ownership on to others. Both
CTA's and Vernor's sales infringed Autodesk's exclusive right to distribute copies
of its work….
Although unnecessary to our resolution of the case, we address the
legislative history in order to address the arguments raised by the parties and
amici. That legislative history supports our conclusion that licensees such as CTA
are not entitled to claim the first sale doctrine. The House Report for §
109 underscores Congress' view that the first sale doctrine is available only to a
person who has acquired a copy via an “outright sale”. H.R.Rep. No. 94-1476, at
79 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5693. The report also asserts
that the first sale doctrine does not “apply to someone who merely possesses a
copy or phonorecord without having acquired ownership of it.” …
Although our holding today is controlled by our precedent, we recognize the
significant policy considerations raised by the parties and amici on both sides of
this appeal.
Autodesk, the Software & Information Industry Association (“SIIA”), and the
Motion Picture Association of America (“MPAA”) have presented policy arguments
that favor our result. For instance, Autodesk argues in favor of judicial
enforcement of software license agreements that restrict transfers of copies of
the work. Autodesk contends that this (1) allows for tiered pricing for different
software markets, such as reduced pricing for students or educational
institutions; (2) increases software companies' sales; (3) lowers prices for all
consumers by spreading costs among a large number of purchasers; and (4)
reduces the incidence of piracy by allowing copyright owners to bring
infringement actions against unauthorized resellers. SIIA argues that a license
can exist even where a customer (1) receives his copy of the work after making
a single payment and (2) can indefinitely possess a software copy, because it is
the software code and associated rights that are valuable rather than the
inexpensive discs on which the code may be stored. Also, the MPAA argues that
a customer's ability to possess a copyrighted work indefinitely should not compel
a finding of a first sale, because there is often no practically feasible way for a
consumer to return a copy to the copyright owner.
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Vernor, eBay, and the American Library Association (“ALA”) have presented
policy arguments against our decision. Vernor contends that our decision (1)
does not vindicate the law's aversion to restraints on alienation of personal
property; (2) may force everyone purchasing copyrighted property to trace the
chain of title to ensure that a first sale occurred; and (3) ignores the economic
realities of the relevant transactions, in which the copyright owner permanently
released software copies into the stream of commerce without expectation of
return in exchange for upfront payment of the full software price. eBay contends
that a broad view of the first sale doctrine is necessary to facilitate the creation
of secondary markets for copyrighted works, which contributes to the public
good by (1) giving consumers additional opportunities to purchase and sell
copyrighted works, often at below-retail prices; (2) allowing consumers to obtain
copies of works after a copyright owner has ceased distribution; and (3) allowing
the proliferation of businesses.
The ALA contends that the first sale doctrine facilitates the availability of
copyrighted works after their commercial lifespan, by inter alia enabling the
existence of libraries, used bookstores, and hand-to-hand exchanges of
copyrighted materials. The ALA further contends that judicial enforcement of
software license agreements, which are often contracts of adhesion, could
eliminate the software resale market, require used computer sellers to delete
legitimate software prior to sale, and increase prices for consumers by reducing
price competition for software vendors. It contends that Autodesk's position (1)
undermines 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(2), which permits non-profit libraries to lend
software for non-commercial purposes, and (2) would hamper efforts by nonprofits to collect and preserve out-of-print software. The ALA fears that the
software industry's licensing practices could be adopted by other copyright
owners, including book publishers, record labels, and movie studios.
These are serious contentions on both sides, but they do not alter our
conclusion that our precedent … requires the result we reach. Congress is free,
of course, to modify the first sale doctrine and the essential step defense if it
deems these or other policy considerations to require a different approach.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
NOTES AND QUESTIONS
1. Compare with Vernor, Apple, Inc. v. Psystar Corp., 658 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir.
2011), which held that the first sale doctrine did not protect a firm that
purchased copies of the Apple operating system on DVDs and sold them to
customers for installation on its own competing computers:
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The DVD purchasers were licensees, not owners, of the software. The
Mac OS X SLA, states that the software is “licensed, not sold, to [the
customer] by Apple Inc. (Apple) for use only under the terms of this
License.” Thus the SLA provides that Apple “retain[s] ownership of the
Apple Software itself.” The SLA also imposes significant use and transfer
restrictions, providing, inter alia, that a licensee may only run one copy
and “may not rent, lease, lend, redistribute or sublicense the Apple
Software.” Cf. Wall Data [Inc. v. Los Angeles County Sheriff's Dept.,] 447
F.3d 769 at 785 [(9th Cir. 2006)] (“Generally, if the copyright owner
makes it clear that she or he is granting only a license to the copy of
software and imposes significant restrictions on the purchaser's ability to
redistribute or transfer that copy, the purchaser is considered a licensee,
not an owner, of the software.”). The license thus satisfied Vernor's three
factor test for demonstrating the existence of a licensor/licensee
relationship.
2. European law now recognizes a "first download" doctrine, adopted by the
European Court of Justice in 2012, in Case C-128/11, UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle
International Corp., 2012 E.C.R. I-0000. Under that rule someone who
purchases downloaded software for its full value and with no obligation to return
it is legally entitled to transfer the software to another buyer. The clear
implication is that the transferor at that point has no further right to use the
software herself. The Court reasoned that the purposes of the first sale doctrine
would be frustrated if a copyright holder could avoid it by selling downloaded
software rather than software burned onto a tangible medium such as a CDROM.
The decision raises a number of interesting issues. First, digital software
does not ordinary "pass" from seller to buyer; rather, one transfers it by making
a copy. Of course, the seller can then independently delete it (or not). These
verification problems do not normally exist when a protected good such as a
book is transferred. Second, as it is articulated the first download doctrine
seems easy to evade simply by calling the download a "license" and limiting its
duration. However, in this case Oracle, the copyright holder, stated that it was
giving away the software together with a fee-paid license to use it. The
European Court did not buy that argument. Third, what about limited use
licenses in which the copyright owner uses a digital key or counter to limit the
number of times that a copy of downloaded software can be installed on a
different computer. The court expressly held that the licensee did not have a
right to sell his unused authorizations. Id. at §69. The limitation is interesting
because it conflicts with the ordinary rules of appurtenant interests that permit
measured, or corporeal uses, to be divided. For example, if someone acquires
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the right to take 100 tons of sand annually from my riverbed, that right can be
divided so long as the total demand does not exceed 100 tons.
What about media other than software? Should someone who purchases
a Hollywood movie by download be able to resell the download? Should the
owner of an iPod or similar device be able to sell the iPod with all of its songs? or
the owner of an eBook reader?
One impact of a decision such as UsedSoft may be to increase the use of
digital anticircumvention devices in order to restrict transfers or reassignments
that the copyright owner may prefer not to make.
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